The Anti-Dumping Analysis Based On Retaliation Threat

The retaliation threat as a mechanism has "dampening effect" onfirst-mover's retaliated action. It could reduce the possible of retaliationacting. It has important meaning to research that whether the retaliation threatmechanism would work on the anti-dumping fields or not on the backgroundof international anti-dumping case has substantially increased. On the onehand the number was on the top whatever the number of approved case or theaffirmative anti-dumping measure or the amount in the case. China has beenconfronted with crucible anti-dumping situation. On the other hand, Chinahas used the anti-dumping measure to protecting the domestic industry afterthe first Anti-dumping Act issuing. China's corporation has the experience ofusing the anti-dumping measure to protect the legal-profit of domesticindustry.The motivations of my research were, firstly, it was worthy toresearching that whether the retaliation threat mechanism may keep back the fast increase step of anti-dumping or not because of the suspicion abuse useof anti-dumping measure. Secondly, it has imminent actual meaning toanalysis the anti-dumping from retaliation threat because of its unfair to ourfirms that other countries make the continuous use of anti-dumping measuresagainst china on the conditions that the total-market-directed economy ofchina has not been identified. Thirdly, China's step of use the anti-dumpingmeasure was still slow so whether the retaliation threat mechanism has thedampening effect on china's ADD procedure or not. The retaliation threat as amechanism whether has general mean or not and whether it has failure toChina or not. The two problems should been proved from empirical analysisand then some reasonable advise has been put forward. All those haveimportant meanings.The thesis has adopted the approach of qualitative analysis associatedwith quantitative analysis and the approach of normative research associatedwith positive research according to the main subject. It has summarized keyprocedure of two important phase from the anti-dumping procedure based onanalyzing the factors influencing the anti-dumping decision after introducingthe new characters of international, to-China anti-dumping. And throughsetting up the theory framework of retaliation threat mechanism from thehorizontal of firm and nation based on gaming theory the context hasconstructed the logistic regression model to put to the empirical proof of theretaliation factors influencing the china government's anti-dumping decision. The research indicated that the retaliation threat has damping effect oninternational-to-china anti-dumping making-decision and also it has the sameeffect on American-to-china's anti-dumping decision but the retaliation threatmechanism's "damping effect" has failure to china's foreign anti-dumpingmaking-decision in the course of china's Anti-dumping Acts' issuing in 1997and entering the WTO.Chapter 1,2,3 and 4 of the thesis introduced the background knowledgeand theory research. Chapter 5 was the content of the empirical analysis oflogistic regression model from retaliation threat about china and make anapproach to the retaliation threat's function on china's foreign anti-dumpingmaking-decision procedure. Chapter 6 summarized the thesis and put forwardsome advice.