| The performance of control right transfer has become a hot topic in academia, because control right market is an important exterior governing mechanism ofcorporate governance (CG) in such a way that with the restriction againstmanagement layer, one can ensure the regular and healthy operation of corporations.Along with the development of control rights market in China, control fight transferhas made a great progress in both quantity and quality. Especially after 2000, as thesupervision system was standardized, the quantity of substantial mergers andacquisitions (M&A) began to exceed the quantity of Reverse Merger. However, withthe special ownership structure in China, it is deserved to concern the role that controlright market is playing. At present, many domestic disquisitions use the samples onlybefore 2000, and the outcomes are different.Therefore this paper's purpose is to find out whether control right transfer couldimprove the performance of corporations, with the help of the latest data and samplesand empirical analysis methods, and furthermore to reveal which factors can reallyinfluence the performance of corporations, and which factors are certain motivationsin control right transfer without the intent of improving performance. The conclusionscan hopefully be used to improve the efficiency of current M&A, to help thestakeholders face a new round of M&A with a more rational attitude and to providesome experiential evidences and theoretical supports to the reform of non-tradableshares.Firstly, this paper sums up literatures from both China and foreign countries. Andbased on theoretical explanation, the paper uses data samples of listed companieswhose control rights have been transferred in the year between 2000 and 2002. Factoranalysis method is used to measure the corporate performance in the year of [-1, +3] before and after control fight transfer. Then the paper uses descriptive statistics andmultiple linear regression to study which factors really have impact on thecorporations after control fight transfer. Finally normative research is pursued to studyother motivations or factors that can lead to control right transfer.The main research results are: (1) At the same year of control right transfer, theperformance of Chinese listed companies had a certain degree of decline, and in thefollowing 3 years after control right transfer, the performance went through a processof up first and down afterwards. However in general, the performance after controlright transfer is better than before in despite of the slight markedness, which showsthe efficiency of Chinese control right market still need to be raised further. (2) In thefactors of control right structure, the sharehold percentage of controlling shareholderand the property of NO.1 shareholder have a certain effects on the performance ofcorporations. However, the other factors didn't impact on the performancesignificantly. Specifically, after Control fight transfer, the group of holding a ratiohigher than 50% control right (absolute control) is better than the group of holding aratio less than 50% (relative control) on performance improvement. In the samplegroup of 2002, the corporations whose new controlling shareholder are state-ownedenterprises improved the performance better than those whose new controllingshareholder are non-state-owned enterprises; In the sample group whose newcontrolling shareholder are non-private enterprise, some other control fight structurefactors began to have a significant impact on performance of listed companies.According to the above research on the status quo of control right transfer inChina, this paper brings forward some further suggestions to improve the efficiencyof control right market, such as to continue to construct the control right market, tooptimize ownership structure of listed companies, to enhance the "supportiveregulation" by China Securities Regulatory Commission, and to strengthen thefunction of capital market, etc. |
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