The Research On Issues Of Privately-offered Funds' Profit And Risk With The Relationship Of Delegation And Agent In Our Country

Private-offered Fund (PF) hasn't been given a clear legitimate status in our country. In short of related law, the operation of PF is not regulated and transparent. Many problems arise in the process of practice and bring about large damages to the stock market in our country.The author tries to study the profit apportioning options and the credit risk in the regular development of Chinese PF from the perspective of delegation and agent. The study also includes some fundamental researches which will benefit the moral supervision and legal supervision on PF in the future. Different from other articles in domestic which only discussed in general, the research analyzes in particular the solutions of problems in the regular development of PF, according to the current condition of the PF's development in our country, from the perspective of delegation and agent. Comparison and game theory are used in the analysis to systematically study the profit apportioning options of PF in our country.The beginning of the article is the introduction of the research background. Related articles and researches in domestic and overseas are comprehensively covered and the definition of PF is given. In the following the development of PF in our country is divided into several phases and the characteristics of each phase are studied in depth. A conclusion that the uniqueness of PF decides the uniqueness of its relationship of delegation and agent is drawn. After this part is the study of the profit apportioning problem in the regular development of PF in our country in use of comparison analysis and game theory analysis. Profit-taking methods under different circumstances of risk avoidance are compared and comprehensively appraised. And then through the analysis of the specialty of PF's credit risk and the rationality of risk formation, the author states the property ownership of PF changes the relationship of delegation and agent between investors and managers of public funds so that it effectively solves the in-depth problem of missing subject of interest in public-offered funds. Besides this the author also gives solutions for avoiding legal risks in the relationship of delegation and agent of PF from the perspective of solving general problems. The generalization and related advice make up the final part of the article.