The Research Of The Correlation Between Domination Transfer And Corporate Performance Based On Different Stock Structure

Market for corporate control theory is not only one of the most important motifs in the theory of corporate, economics and finance, but also the focus of dispute in the theory circles. It is vital to research in market for corporate control theory, which has theoretic and practical meaning to activate stock assets, to improve the stock structure of a company and to contribute to the reform of state-owned enterprise in China. By theoretically analyzing, we consider that we should maintain the mainstream status of market for corporate control theory. After stock non-tradability reform, shareholder structure of listed companies in China should be optimized, but the phenomenon of concentrative shareholder structure and absolute majority shareholder structure can not eliminate soon. At the same time, in order to reduce the influence of external complication, we take the listed companies as the example which involves the holding transfer in year 2004, and emphasize that share holding is the actual control power to a company. Transfer mode is compensatory and negotiable. The research results indicate that domination transfer is going towards the rational trend; domination transfer can improve the achievements between acquiring firms and target firms, but significantly bring the wealth to shareholders of acquiring firms. The holding transfer between listed companies in China can also effectively compensate for inadequate corporate governances structure and defects of the nonstandard market environment. In these transactions, the companies having the characteristic of management shareholdings can take more achievements than those companies which don't have that characteristic. The difference of shareholder structure affects the corporate performance after domination transfer remarkably. And Cumulative Abnormal Return of the purchasers is better than the bargainers. The bargainers that the proportion of the national shareholder is maximal have the best achievement after the trade. Then, the bargainers that the administrant have their shares, also have a remarkable achievement after the trade.So management shareholdings as an incentive mechanism can ease the agency problem.