A Study On The Salary Incentive System For High Management In Listed Company

As to the research on modern company theories, top management incentive is one of the key problems, and salary incentive is the core issue of top management incentive. Western countries, especially the U.S.A, have been enriching top management incentive theory with their economy practice. Taking U.S.A as an example, we found that it has achieved good top management performance through measures such as giving high pay, setting up profit-share system as well as emphasizing the importance of long-term incentive system. However, in china, because the central agency of state-owned enterprises is not single and clear, agents of state-owned enterprises lack motivations to stimulate top management. As a result, top management incentive systems of state-owned enterprises, especially the long-term systems, are still a tough issue. Meanwhile, the newly arising private companies are also facing problems to improve their managerial structures and establish efficient top management schemes.As regards the objective of this thesis, incentive is difficult to measure and sort, therefore, we will replace it with measurable substitution"compensation"approximately. Considering in China constitution of monetary compensation is salary, we made a detailed study on salary as the substitution for monetary compensation. Generally speaking, the types of enterprises may affect salary incentive. But as for China background, listed companies are most reformed and market-oriented. Listed companies can provide us with more comparable information. Thus we chose listed companies as our samples in the thesis.As for the study methodology, this paper follows the combination of traditional normative and empirical studies of economics research. We try to gain the result by scientific analysis and deduction under the constraints of data and theoretical tools.As to the content of the thesis, it mainly answered three questions. What is the current situation of top management salary incentive of listed companies in China and the relation between salary incentive and top management performance? What problems exist in top management salary incentive systems of Chinese listed companies? How to design a scientific top management salary incentive system to solve the problems we found? The third chapter of this paper answers question one and two. While the forth chapter deals with the third question.In chapter three, we first studied the current situation of Chinese listed companies top management salary incentive as well as the relation between salary and performance. During the study, we discovered that our manager market is not well developed; the pay is largely determined by the industrial and regional characteristic. The percentage of companies whose top management takes no stock ownership is high; the amount of long-term salary is small; and the composition of top management salary is simple. Meanwhile, we discovered there is an obvious stable correlation between the levels of salary and top management performance, that is to say increasing stock ownership percentage of top management in the company is helpful to raise company performance.In chapter four, the thesis will figure out the principles and targets of top management salary incentive scheme design. We will also design a salary incentive scheme pattern for the listed companies which are based on market economy system background. Moreover, in the forth chapter, we are also to put forward measures for constructing a better environment in order to serve the optimization of top management salary incentive systems of Chinese listed companies.