If The Efficiency Of Market For State-owned Listed Corporate Control Under The Circumstances Of All Shares Circulation Has Been Strengthened Or Not?

For a long time, the phenomenon of circulating share and non-circulating share split in the structure of stockholding of listed company in China, which has become the main obstacle of healthy and sustainable development affecting China's capital market and listed company, and has become the most sensitive factor influencing the stock market. Shareholder right splitting is the most serious institutional defect of China's capital market. It destroyed common interests' foundations of all the shareholders of listed companies, and distorted the allocating function of stock resources of capital market, which resulted in the loss of inherent sustainable motivation of China's capital market. To actively boost the reform of shareholder right splitting was the most significant, complex and urgent task faced by China's capital market. On April 29^th 2005, the bond supervision conference issued "concerning listed company ownership of a share the cent place reform an experimental unit the notice concerning problem" which symbolized our country ownership of a share the cent place to reform a formal start. The advantages of shareholders will be accorded through the reforming of share-split, pricing mechanism and standard will recover in the era after share-split, the market for corporate control as a role of external corporate governance will be improved and laid a solid foundation. After the shareholding reform comes to the end, the wholly -circulation era of the capital market will arrive soonThe controlling rights are the focus of corporation governance, the linkage between microcosmic enterprise management and macroscopically capital market. Therefore, the market for corporate control is the significant support for the linkage, the essence of transference of corporate control is to reallocate the rare social resources. Thus, the efficient evaluation of corporate control transference focuses on whether the resources reallocation has improved and increased corporate value, and eventually enhanced the social wealth. Merger & Acquisition is the most fascinating scenery in the capital markets. As a company action under market economy conditions, M&A is an effective way to achieve company expansion and a method to optimize resource. The reform of equity division has solved the problem of the flow of State-owned shares, built a platform for optimizing the corporate control. Fundamentally speaking, full circulation of shares and reduction of shares by major shareholders moderately are propitious to improve the market for China' State-owned listed corporate control and the performance of the corporations. However, In view of the experience of the non-circulation shares went on the market, as well as the reform experiment of the state-owned stock to reduce hold which has been carried on our country stock market three times but has not greatly obtained the test result, the deep contradictions of the State-owned listed company have not been solved. This paper focuses on whether efficiency of social resource has been the enhanced and the operating performance been improved after the reform.This paper based on market for corporate control theory, efficient capital market hypothesis theory, transaction cost theory and efficiency of M&A theory, adopts descriptive statistics and literature review, carries on a theoretical and empirical research on Market for State-owned listed corporate control.This paper draws these conclusions:1. External governance role of market for corporate control has been weaken and the efficiency of market for State-owned corporate control is extremely low, because of share split.2. In the short term of reform, performance of state-owned listed companies and performance of M&A have not been improved, the M&A-performance of non-state-owned listed companies is better than state-owned listed companies.3. Reform of share split create the conditions for optimize the resources allocation, but it does not mean that effective market for corporate control had been made. Comparative international experience shows that state-owned shares in circulation need to be restricted especially the strategic sectors and industry. We need establish and improve relevant system for the market.