Study On The Supply Chain Incentive Mechanism Based On The Principal-agent Model

The supply chain enterprises are based on the full trust and the good coordination, enterprises on this chain must achieve synchronization, only then has the possibility to enable all enterprises with profit. But various members' benefit and responsibility are different, so their local interest are not in consistent with the goal of the supply chain system, and the performance of the overall system to be reduced. The lacks of the effective surveillance mechanism and the incentive mechanism is the reason of unstable between the supply chain enterprises. Therefore how to solve the angent problem between supplier who is a principal and retailer who is an agent merchant's is an important attribute, and the principal-agency theory already to be standard frame which is used to researching the problem when information is notsymmetry.How to establish an effective incentive-constrain mechanism for an agent of the supply chain? In this article, based on ready reference and research, we provide incentive-constrain game model of agent with game theory on condition that the information is notsymmetry between principal and agent. In this way, we establish the model of optimal dynamic incentive mechanism for the supply chain enterprise.The article includes five parts. The chapter one is introduction. This part introduces the research background, practical significance, summarize of the domestic and foreign research literature, topic basis, research content as well as innovations of the article. The chapter two is principal-agency theory review. This part provides the basic model of principal-agency and summarize extend model of principal-agency through introducing the development of principal-agency relationship and theory hypothesis and so on. In the chapter three, in which establishes an incentive-constrain mechanism game model. First it structure an explicit incentive mechanism of mathematical model, which give the related characteristic and the correlation explanation under the information symmetry and asymmetrical condition, then joined a new variable in it and structure an incentive mechanism model under the relative achievement comparison, finally aimed at a mathematical model of the recessive incentive mechanism, which analyze the function of the reputation effect in the agency question. The chapter four, in which established three kinds of supply chain incentive mechanism model: the explicit incentive mechanism under information symmetry and asymmetrical condition, the relative achievement comparison incentive mechanism model and the model of optimal dynamic incentive mechanism. The chapter five is conclusion of the article.