Research In The "Company+Peasant Households" Model Based On The Game Of Not-Equivalent Power

The industrial management of agriculture is an important action of promoting agricultural development and realizing agriculture modernization in our country. The industrial management of agriculture sped up the transformation from the traditional farming to the modern agriculture in our country. The industrial production organizations which are being formed join to more and more peasant households. This is not only the transformation of mode of business operation, moreover is the evolution of form of industrial organization. The "company + peasant households" model in the industrial management of agriculture in our country, is liked by the farmers because of the function of avoiding price risk and the sales risk, simultaneously is liked by the merchants because it may also reduce the transaction cost and spread the loss. But in practice the low compliance rate has a serious impact on the industrialization of agriculture development.In this paper, a new perspective - not-equivalent power between company and peasant households, and research the "company + peasant households" model in the industrial management of agriculture from the angle of improving agricultural performance of the sales contract. In the course of the study, I put forward to the three determining factors of power and the range of power causes, and do the game analysis from the two aspects of farmers led to the risks and corporate behavior led to the risk. Then according to the shortcomings of "company + peasant households" model, analyze "company + farmers intermediary organizations + peasant households" model with the introduction of an intermediary organization by the calculation of Shapley value of league game from the main interests of the income distribution, to find a more reasonable arrangement to change the not-equivalent power and improve compliance rate and achieve a stable contractual relationship.At first, I do a brief introduction about the background and theory, the practical significance, literature review and research ideas and so on. I also do an introductory about the game theory, including the development of game theory, the game's basic elements and the classification of game and so on. Then, using the knowledge of game theory, I analyze the "company + peasant households" model based on the "not-equivalent power", Including the determining factors of power and the range of power causes, and do the game analysis from the two aspects of farmers led to the risks and corporate behavior led to the risk under the influence of the not-equivalent power, then, using the knowledge of league game and method of Shapley value calculation analyze the beneficial effects and mode of operation from "company + intermediary organizations + peasant households" to the original model of with the introduction of an intermediary organization, and do a demonstration to the "company + peasant households" model and the "company + intermediary organizations + peasant households" model. On this basis, I give the task of conclusions and recommendations.