Study On Actual Controller,Excess Control And Corporate Performance In The Listed Companies In China

Corporate ownership and control right has always been one of hot issues. Some researchers, such as LLSV, showed evidence that to some extent corporate ownership around the world is concentrated. Therefore, almost all of the recent studies on corporate governance are based on the LLSV hypothesis. Thus, with LLSV hypothesis adopted in this paper, I manage to find out the actual controllers in the listed companies in China. The paper studies the actual controllers'effect on the corporate performance by two dimensions: the ownership characters of the actual controllers, which indicates that the actual controllers is state-owned entity or non-state-owned entity and character of the specific classification, and the excessive control system the actual controllers have, which means that the effect on the corporate performance brought by the separation between the control right and cash flow right of actual controllers on the aspect of ownership structure (defined as the first layer of excessive control system) and also means the effect on the corporate performance brought by the deviation degree of control right form the majority of seats the actual controllers get in the Board of Trustees (defined as the second layer of excessive control system).Firstly, in theory, based on expounding the theories on control right of a company and control of the over-allocation, derived from the mathematical model about the first layer of excessive control system and corporate performance, we reached conclusions as following: (1) When the actual controller have more cash flow right, the tunnel of the company's profits will be less;(2) When the actual controller have more control right, the tunnel of the company's profits will be more;(3) When the actual controller are facing lower marginal cost due to the different ownership characters, the tunnel of the company's profits will be more.Secondly, on the side of experiment, taking all listed companies in A stock market in 2003-2005 as samples, by analyzing the relationship between excessive control system of different kinds of actual controllers and corporate performance, the paper concludes: (1) The different state-owned institutions as actual controllers have different influence on the corporate performance. State Council national capital committee, separated in addition to the operating performance of listed companies have negative effects, the other actual controllers on the state on the operating performance of listed companies have positive impact in the corporate governance structure, state-owned real Control Board through occupy the majority of seats and control of the separation of the operating performance of listed companies with a negative impact;(2)For the actual controllers in the private listed companies, the first layer of excessive control system affects the corporate performance positively, conflicting with the conclusion of most home and foreign scholars; The second layer of excessive control system affects the corporate performance negatively; when the actual controllers are artificial general corporate enterprises, the first layer of excessive control system does not affect the corporate performance, and when the number of the directors nominated by actual controllers exceeds the proportion of ownership, it will has negative impact on corporate performance.Finally, on the basis of study and experiment in the previous text of demonstration, we put forward four enlightenments on corporate governance structure and the healthy development of capital markets, and give appropriate policy recommendations.