A Research Of Private Benefits Of Control In Closely-held Listed Corporations

As the research in the field of Corporate Governance deepens, the core issue in corporate governance has been shifted to the question that how to deal with the agent problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. Private benefits extraction in closely-held corporations has become the attention of this problem.At first, the paper simply introduced theories about private benefit extraction to know how the process and switching in research of private benefits extraction and derive the research this paper took attention. The research of Private benefits extraction in closely-held corporations has been caring about Because of the shifting of corporate governance.Then, the paper introduced theories of Private benefits extraction in closely-held corporations including theories researches and model researches. And this paper's focus is to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm value from shareholders group.Based on these introductions, the paper made empirical research about Private benefits extraction in closely-held corporations in China. The paper chose Shanghai Stock Exchange's corporations as representatives. After deleting ineligible samples, the paper choose 665 corporations as research samples and included two sub-samples, minimal stake group and 5 largest group. The progress of empirical research is firstly to made simple statistic and descript the result. Then the paper estimated multinomial Logit model and OLS model with the variables. Last the paper got the result, there is certain relationship between ownership structure and firm value; ownership structure with one shareholder or two shareholders is not benefit for firm value; Second shareholder is not benefit for firm value; smaller, listed longer, industry more concentrated firms perform better than other firms. The paper analyzed the empirical results considering real situation in China.The last is the suggestions, including perfecting the supervision mechanism, improving laws and changing the ownership structure with one shareholders or two shareholders.