Management Of Listed Companies On Compensation Contract

Since reform and opening up,China's listed companies has made considerable development at the same time,China's senior managers of listed companies "moral failure" often occurred,the imbalance between compensation and performance, lack of incentive and motivation improper phenomena such as coexistence, a serious impact on China's Listed The company sustained, rapid and healthy development.Enterprises in the framework of the contract theory, enterprises, in essence, a contract is the connection point, its function is defined by various interest groups to obtain its business in the allocation of cash flow and other resources the right to circumvent the various interest groups for self-serving acts And lead to conflicts of interest. Modern corporate system under the ownership and management rights led to the separation between business executives and shareholders of potential conflict of interest, and the management of their compensation contract adjustable between shareholders and managers with the potential conflict of interest as many enterprises in a contract. Through this contract managers agreed to constitute a reward, encourage managers to select and implement activities to increase shareholder wealth and thus control the risk of moral hazard managers to achieve the objective of reducing agency costs.With WTO accession, economic integration wave sweeping across the world, foreign companies in the management of compensation contract management aspects of the practice showed progress in diversifying trend. Different countries and regions in the company's management incentive compensation, whether in quantity or structure has its own characteristics. We found that the country is perhaps reflects the differences in pay system, including the entire corporate governance structure of the national conditions of adaptability. The management of the company's management did not pay a fixed model of global unity, but the United States and Britain, Germany, and other representative on the management practice of compensation contract for the management of China's listed companies reward good deeds and improve a reference value.In this paper, China's Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges listed companies reward executives in 1997-2007 relate to relevant data, management of listed companies on China's actual compensation contract status of statistical analysis, found that due to historical and objective reasons, China's listed companies has yet to establish a Case proven executives reward incentive mechanism. Members of the remuneration of senior management of major fixed pay additional grey posts hidden income and consumption. This grey veil over the abnormal performance of the major incentive for the portfolio system:a single way of reward, reward structure is irrational, remuneration structure in the short and long-term incentive imbalance, the content is not clear incentives, pay levels and the performance of senior management relations, such as imbalance Both phenomena. At the same time, in theoretical explanations and analysis on the basis of this paper that executives of listed companies to improve the compensation contract and will take internal and external governance of listed companies from the start with the environment, the combination of management incentive compensation contracts, in carefully selected performance indicators, financial indicators and Both non-financial indicators on the basis of executive remuneration and enhance the relevance of the company's performance, the source governance, norms is very necessary. At the same time, mature and effective manager who market to effectively regulate the system of executive opportunism, so that the interests of clients and agents agree. Finally, statistical analysis and the full draw at home and abroad on the basis of practice, listed companies on China's management compensation contract for the design of the relevant policy recommendations.