The Positive Research On Ralativities Between Earnings Management And Corporate Governance Structure Of Our Country's Listed Companies

With the development of China's securities market, the problems of earnings management appear gradually which have become one of the central researches of our country's accounting areas. As accounting information is the object of earnings management and has close relation to corporate governance structure, it has great significance to do positive research on the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance structure of listed companies. This will provide forceful basis for encouraging listed companies to enhance corporate governance and restraining earnings management of listed companies.First of all, the paper introduces respectively the conceptions of earnings management and corporate governance structure as well as some relative theories. Then it expatiates the motivations and means of earnings management as well as the general pattern of corporate governance structure and current situation of our country's corporate governance structure. It also discusses corporate governance structure's impact on earnings management from the point of theoretical analysis. Subsequently, according to the characteristic of our country's earnings management motivation, it chooses the listed companies which made rights offering from the year 2002 to 2004 as samples, and discusses the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance structure of the samples from the point of positive analysis.In the design of positive research, based on the analysis of existing earnings management measuring models, the extended Jones model is improved, and as a result, a new model is made and used in this paper. Some variables in direction, shares structure and board of supervisors are chosen as measure index of corporate governance structure, and some controlling variables are also chosen. Then, the paper brings forward some research hypothesis. When earnings management degree is measured, the paper chooses the data of listed companies which don't have obvious earnings management motivations to estimate parameters. It also makes F-test and t-test to the models to validate their applicability. Then the earnings management degrees of samples are estimated, and the paper makes single sample t-test to them. Lastly, it makes multivariate regress analysis to earnings management, corporate governance structure and controlling variables. The results show that the rate of independent directors has positive correlation with earnings management degree, and independent directors can't restrain earnings management action effectively; when the board chairmen holds a concurrent post of general manager, earnings management action is easier to happen; when shares owning rate of directors is very low, it hasn't remarkable impact on earnings management action; earning management degree doesn't have correlation with shares owning rate of the first shares holders on condition that the biggest share holders hold absolute ruling status; the second to fifth shares holders'check degree to first share holders has the negative correlation with earnings management degree; shares owning rate of organ investor has negative correlation with earning management degree; the rate of external supervisor has positive correlation with earnings management degree, and external supervisor can't restrain earnings management action effectively; asset-liability ratio and corporation size has positive correlation with earnings management degree. Finally, the paper makes some suggestions about how to perfect corporate governance structure so that it can restrain earning management action.