The Study Of Agile Supply Chain Benefit Assignment Policy Conflict

Along with the world economical integration, market competitive globalization, customer demand personalize, and especially the development of information technology, which have taken the opportunity and challenge to the survival and development of enterprises. It is a dynamic process when a agile supply chain alliance develops, and the existence of conjunct profit is the base of cooperation between the different member enterprises. Thus the distribution of conjunct profit becomes the most attentive by the member enterprises.Firstly this article reviews research literatures on study of the importance of the agile supply chain benefit assignment to explain how the benefit assignment have effect on the effective operation of the agile supply chain. In this paper, the strategy of the member enterprises is compartmentalized into rational and irrational. Because it is difficult for the member enterprises to keep similarity in the whole process of cooperation union. Then, we can analyze the mechanism of the member enterprises'selection of tactics. After the understanding of the reasons about the policy conflict, both the common policy conflicts and corresponding solutions are enumerated.Secondly, two game models are constructed to simulate the real process of the agile supply chain benefit assignment and the correspondence is explained clearly. It is should be taken into account that the member enterprises wouldn't only choose pure strategies but also mixed strategies. So the three-level theory is introduced to show the correspondence between the different level decision theory and the selection of the tactics. The purpose is to demonstrate the logical principles in the process of the member enterprises'selection.Finally,the strictly logical reasoning of the two game model by the three-level theory give two conclusions. One is about the inevitability of the policy conflict in the process of the profit allocation. There are two reasons for the inevitability. The internal reason is the comparison of the profit in the member enterprises. The external reason is that the process of the selection of the policy of cooperation affects the member enterprises'degree of satisfaction about expected profit. Another is about the reasonable of the evolutionarily stable strategies.