The Research On The VAT Evasion By The Conspiracy Of The Cash Transaction Between Enterprises

Since our country introduces the value-added tax, it has increased the national fiscal revenues, brought an advance in the international trade and improved the economic development of our country. In our country's tax system, the value-added tax has played an important role all the time. So improving the expropriation and management level of the value-added tax could keep the growth of the national fiscal revenues and strengthen the ability for the macro control of the country. It is important to the management of the value-added tax that controlling the tax evasion of the value-added tax. To facilitate the tax authority's administration to the value-added tax, this thesis analyses the influence factors of the value-added tax evading by the conspiracy among enterprises. This thesis especially researches the influence factors to the double-control subject enterprise as a seller, conspiring with the buyer to escape the value-added tax through the cash transaction.Firstly, this thesis illuminates the current status of the value-added tax in our country. And the existing questions of the value-added tax in our country have been analyzed. Secondly, this text uses the static model A-S which is the basic theories about tax evasion to analyze the seller's and the purchaser's behaviors in the conspiracy. We find that the seller and the purchaser playing chess with the government to evade the value-added tax. And the conspiracy of evading taxes is always suggested by the seller or purchaser, and then both sides conspire. This text also analyzes the functions that the cash transaction played in evading the value-added tax. Based on the static model about the value-added tax evasion, we introduce the principal-agent tax evasion model to establish the model of the double-control subject enterprises evading the value-added tax. This thesis analyzes the influence factors to the double-control subject enterprise as a seller, conspiring with the buyer to escape the value-added tax through the cash transaction. Based on the new model, this thesis analyzes the optimal decision of the value-added tax evasion and explains the corresponding conclusions. Based on the theoretical analysis and the actual situation of China, this thesis puts forward some policy recommendations towards the value-added tax evasion fathering of enterprises with double-control subjects.