The Ownership-structure's Influence On The Performance Of M&A: An Empirical Research On Chinese Listed Companies

China's capital market development has been experienced more than 10 years, the total number of listed companies rose to 1550 by the end of 2007. Mergers and acquisitions as an effective measure optimizing the allocation of resources, improving economic efficiency and achieving economies of scale, has been widely accepted by the general managers. Whether M&A transactions of listed companies can enhance their performance has close links with the ownership structure. Shareholding structure is the core of the corporate governance, however the China's unreasonable shareholding structure may directly affect the quality of M&A transactions. Main purpose of this paper is: on the basis of theoretical analysis, test the relationship between China's shareholding structure of listed companies with the performance of M&A to perfect the ownership structure of China's listed companies, to improve the performance of M&A, and to regulate the capital market development for providing the basis.Based on the principal-agent theory, the paper analyzed the major stakeholders'acquisition motive and focused on illustrating the impact of shareholding structure on the performance of M&A from the quality of controlling shareholder, the management shares, stock concentration and proportion of shares in circulation. Based on the issue of《management of listed companies on M&A》in 2002,the paper chose part of representative samples from the Shanghai exchange and the Shenzhen exchanges in 03,04 to test shareholding structure's impact on performance of M&A with the multiple linear regression analysis. In order to objectively reflect the financial performance of M&A, the paper selected 12 financial rates to constitute a comprehensive evaluation index system, and used factor analysis to calculate the comprehensive score.The results showed that: In generally speaking, the financial performance of the M&A of the listed companies in China experience from drop to rise; The quality of state-owned shareholders has a negative correlation with performance of M&A owing to the "the principal vacancy"; shareholding of management has a negative correlation with performance of M&A, but not significantly. Stock concentration has a negative correlation with the performance of M&A, the controlling shareholder who undermine the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders is the main reason which impair the performance of M&A ; shares in circulation has a positive correlation with performance of M&A proving that with the increasing in the proportion of shareholding, "free-rider" problem has been reduced in some extent.Finally, make some recommendations: establish state-owned assets supervision and management companies; introduce more independent directors; set up a healthy market of professional managers; found an effective incentive and restraint mechanisms between shareholders and managers; continue to deepen the reform of non-tradable shares.