The Study On Independence Of Open Fund Trustees In China

As the most important kind of mutual,the opened fund has been developed rapidly from 2001 in Chinese securities market.But after the "inside story of fund" in 2000 to year 2004, only one trustee of open fund report the wrong behavior of fund manager,that is the construction bank of China reported the behaviors getting out of line of fund manager of Rong Tong Xinlanchou to Securities Committee of China.Under the incomplete structure of fund management company,trustees always provides clean opinion to finance reports of fund,which shows that the trustee do not do their best in supervise duty.The phenomenon catches scholars' eyes and worry the operator.Under this background,research of the independence of fund trustee is meaningful to theoretic and operation.This thesis first reviews and summarizes the literature about the trustee of fund;introduce the general conditions of open fund trustee market of China by data analysis;Then applies the principle-agent theory to analyze the reasons and behavior of trustee lacking of independence to find the factors to independence.The case analysis of Xinlanchou find:first,rate of trustee fee is not important point to raise the income of trustee,perhaps there are other ways;second,trustee who are the oligarch in market in more competitive and independent to fund manager;last,the cooperation between fund manager and trustee would provide more opportunity to trustee,so fund trustee will be dependent to his cooperator of fund manager.The main contribution of this thesis is that,based on relevant literature and market analysis taking principle-agent theory as a tool,this thesis analyzed the double agent in open fund and case analysis to find the factor to independence of trustee,which will enrich the study on the factors leading to independence of fund trustee,and supplies suggestions to administration of fund trustee market.