Research On The Institutional Investors Involving In Coporate Governance Of Chinese Listed Company

The reform on corporate governance has become a focus problem attracting widespread concern. Therefore, corporate governance has turned an important researching field of modern financial management. Along with the increasing weight of the institutional investors holding properties of listed companies, as a result, the change of the investment bodies of the stock market had taken place and the investment strategy of the institutional investors changed toward"control-oriented"from "arm's length" This change profoundly changed the governance structure of listed companies and reflected its unique role on resolving the problems of corporate governance of listed companies effectively. As we all know, there are many problems in corporate governance of Chinese listed companies, which restrained greatly the effectiveness of our securities markets. Nowadays, institutional investors are gradually rising in China and its role on solving the problems of corporate governance of listed companies is gradually revealed. The study was carried out in such a background.The logic framework of this thesis is as follows:Firstly, the authors make deeply systematic analysis on the current problems of corporate governance of Chinese listed companies to explain the necessity for institutional to involve in corporate governance from two perspectives of economic models and theories. Secondly, through the introduction of the successful experience of the United States to inquire into the obstacles and responses of institutional investors involving in corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. Finally, from the analysis above, the author consider that the institutional investors have the ability and motive force to participate in corporate governance and put forward some suggestions.In an attempt to provide a complete and in-depth analysis, this thesis applied qualitative analysis, based on the main theories of corporate governance and a huge mount of past research. Although there are still some weaknesses in this thesis, the author still wishes that it could offer a useful reference to practice of institutional shareholder activism in China.