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Study Of Securities Investment Fund Internal Governance Mechanism In China

Posted on:2007-09-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Q NiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360275957704Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The thesis studies on security investment fund governance mechanism, mainly follows the logic way of theories analysis, the model of governance analysis, realistic problem and the policy suggestion. Use the combination of theoretical analysis, empirical studies and comparative analysis to find the best way to improve China's security investment fund governance mechanism.At first, the paper points out: the principal-agency theory magnifies the market efficiency and the opportunism tendency of handlers, which makes the handlers not consider the whole profit and long-term progress of the company but take the market signal as the decision-making rule to pursue the short-term benefit. The nature vices of the fund contract bring the negative effect to the efficiency of the fund contract. So I draw a conclusion that the core problem of the fund government is how to effectively distribute the fund asset between the residuary dominating right and residuary refunding. Then, we compare the governance pattern of American, Britain, and Japan, and think that we are continuing to expand the size of the contract-based investment fund, while building fund trustee proceeds -- risk mechanism learning from the Japanese and Germany model to strengthen supervision of contractual funds. It should also develop a system of independent directors of the company-based funds. Thirdly, we conduct a detailed analysis about the four main benefits associated governance of the Fund. It points that there are several deficiencies on the legal provisions about the Fund holder Assembly. The conducts of fund managers affecting incentive fund smooth operation in conflicts of interest, insider trading, and the risk of moral hazard, reputation deficiencies, motivating errors. Fund management companies are wrong and equity investment behaviors from most institutions merits. In order to tackling the problems, we must enhance the efficiency of independent directors through reputation, remuneration mechanisms and improving procedures and providing more information. In order to tackling the problems, we must enhance the efficiency of independent directors through reputation, remuneration mechanisms and improving procedures and providing more information. In addition that a fixed wage plus performance pay compensation model, using various indicators to measure manager performance standards, development of wages, welfare, honorary and other incentive measures to improve the behaviors of fund managers and administrators. We should improve the law provisions about the Fund holders Assembly and strengthen it operation.
Keywords/Search Tags:governance, reputation mechanism, incentive mechanism, principal-agency
PDF Full Text Request
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