| Based on the data of CEOs'forced turnover in all listed companies of China from 1995 to 2000, we analyze the relationships between CEOs'forced turnover and corporate performance, efficiency of the internal control mechanisms, ownership structure and the level of short-term bank loan using single-index semi-parametric method in this paper. The results show that:1. There exists a negative relationship between CEOs'forced turnover and corporation performance, in this sense, the CEOs'forced turnover is a kind of effective government mechanism;2. The probability of CEOs'forced turnover is high if the largest stockholder is the state-owned business organization;3. The shareholding rate of the largest shareholder cannot explain CEOs'forced turnover significantly. This shows that the major shareholders cannot effectively supervise the CEOs in the situation of "the absence of owner" of state-owned shares, low proportion of tradable shares and thick atmosphere of the market speculation.;4. The negative correlation between the short-term loan rates and CEOs'forced turnover provides the fact that bank does not take actions during the process of creditor governance. It not only has affected the security of bank fund seriously, but also attenuated the efficiency of governing listed companies to a certain extent. Its affect is to be considered. Therefore as the creditor, bank should increase the supervision to listed companies.Finally, this article provides some advices on how to strengthen and consummate corporate governance structure. According to the article, the directors and the major stockholders are the factors that affect the efficiency of the internal control mechanisms. Consequently, deepening stockholder's rights mounted cylinder reform, accomplishing the independent director system as well as the construction of its environment for executing of power are still the key points of company future reform government. |