The Performance Study On Stock Ownership Incentive Of The State-listed Company In China

In western developed countries, the equity incentive mechanism is verified as one of the effective incentive mechanisms to the operator for solving principal-agent problem in the modern enterprises, since the 1990s, some Chinese enterprises have made the attempt. Today, with the development of state-own enterprise reform in China, it has made big progress on compensation incentive mechanism for the state-owned enterprises, especially in the listed companies. At the same time, the researchers affirm the incentive effect of equity incentive mechanism by introducing successful examples. The equity incentive mechanism is regarded as the most potential incentive way in incentive system in future.This paper is based on discussing and dissecting theoretical basis and practice effect interrelated with stock rights incentive, intending to bring out the actual effects produced by applying stock rights incentive in the listed companies by means of positive analysis and find out deep factors which could influence the effects according to positive analysis results. First, the theoretical part analysis concept of equity incentive, models and development process, elaborated on the theoretical basis for equity-based incentives, as well as the positive and negative effects of incentive stock options; And then, based on the theoretical analysis to put up empirical analysis, select state-owned listed companies that began to implement equity-based incentives in 2006 and 2007 in China for the sample, dividing into former and latter stages with the stock right splitting reform, using paired samples T-test values and linear regression correlation test, listed companies in China before and after the implementation of equity incentive performance and between management shareholding ratio and the relationship corporate performance to conduct an empirical analysis. Research result is that there isn't remarkable relationship between managements stock holdings and enterprise's performance, explain the reason to the result on each stage respectively. At last, this paper put forward relevant suggestion and countermeasures against the underlying reason that restrict the full play by managements stock holdings in our country.