Research On The Relationship Of Ownership Centralization And CEO Incentives With Corporate Performance In Small And Medium-sized Enterprises

The questions of ownership centralization and the CEO incentives are the important topics related corporate performance research. Logically, the level of corporate performance has many influent factors and the ownership centralization is one of the important factors. To a great extent, it decides the disposition of domination and the way of government operational mechanism. The efficiency of government operational mechanism had directly decided the level of incents and supervises about CEO, and affects or even decides the efficiency of enterprise business.Through the above analysis, it attempted to answer the questions below:Whether the shareholding ratio of the first major stockholder and the centralized degree of the non-holding major stockholder are the material effect factors to the performance of the Medium and Small-sized enterprise listed in our country? In different situations under the different centralization degrees of stockholder rights, whether or not that the incentive measures to CEO would be good at improving the enterprise performance and how much did the different incentive ways affecting the enterprise performance?The result of demonstration indicated that:when the shareholding ratio of the first major stockholder reached a certain extent, it would be an obvious correlation dependence with the enterprise performance. According to the above result, the paper drawled following conclusions. However, in the situation while the stockholder's rights very scattered, the incentive ways, neither the yearly salary nor the conferring stocks to CEO, could operate efficiently. That means that unless the company government mechanism operated effectively, the incentive mechanism could not work efficiently.