The Researching Of Information Disclosure Supervision Of Chinese Listed Company

Disclosure supervision is of great significance to improve the transparency of securities market, protect the rights and interests of investors,and rational configuration of resources. But the current the effect of information disclosure supervision on the listed companies is not significant in Chinese securities market, there are various problems, including flaws of supervision system and legal system, which lead to lack of deterrent, and the uncultured way of supervision and the old supervision ideas.Start from the basic theory of information disclosure and supervision,researched the study dynamic of information disclosure supervision on the listed companies, found that there lacks overall supervision system construction and the proposal of qualitative analysis of actual tends to operate guidance,used empirical and standard analysis method to analyse the information disclosure supervision of listed companies in China ,and found out the flaws in the supervision system, the legal system,and supervision concepts and methods, etc. This thesis contrasted the USA, UK, Hong Kong's representative ways of information disclosure supervision system, combined with the Chinese securities market environment, raised the practical process of dynamic feedback supervision model:put the listed company self-discipline organization as the main information disclosure supervision agencies under the government securities supervision institutions.It is more flexible and efficient compared with the old way.Formed a whole dynamic feedback system in every aspects from legal system,market rules to the listed examination system ;from the macro market to the companies,the system is more forward-looking, because the proposal is more feasible. Aiming at fulfiling the requirements of this model in Chinese securities market,there are 3 suggests:first, proposes the self-discipline system; second,establish the information disclosure irregularities rating mode;third, establish the internal audit institutions rating and intermediary rating system. From the angle of regulators, use the game analysis method, and found a quantitative appropriate intensity of information disclosure supervision, it has certain significance of the actual operation .