Research On The Relativity Between Top Executive Compensation And Company's Achievement In Listed Electronic Information Enterprises

Facing the challenge of knowledge-economy, top executives do play an important role in running modern enterprises. They are the core part of enterprises, being the important human capital for the enterprises. However,as the separation of property right from managerial right,because of asymmetric information in the market, the owner of a company have to face moral risk and reverse choice of the management, in order to reduce the agency cost, it is important to establish relevant compensation incentive mechanism.Electronic information enterprises are choosen for research, based on reviewing the relevant researeh both of China and abroad,making principal-agent theory and salary theory as the basis, using positive and normative approaches,doing research on the exceutive incentive system of electronic information enterprises in China.In this thesis 47 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Market was selected as sample firms. With descriptive approach, we first analyze the compensation incentive system of executives, such as compensation structure. Through two linear regression models we test the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in order to know the effectiveness of the present compensation system.The empirical results show that the annual salary of the listed electronic information company executives has a significant positive correlation with company performance, company size. This indicates the effectiveness of the electronic information of listed company's executive compensation inventiveness, and it highlights the corporate governance. Executive Ownership and performance are related, but the correlation was not significant, the existing equity incentive policy can not motivate executives to improve corporate performance, in particular, can not motivate executives to make long-term development plan.In order to establish long-term incentive mechanism,several suggestions were given based on the former analysis in the end of paper. For one thing,incentive mechanism should be improved, increase the compensation of executives; Pay more attention to long-term incentive such as increase the percentage of the stock held by top executives; choose the proper incentive methods. For another,constraining should be strengthen by effective actions.