Research On The Family-controlled Tunneling Behavior And Propping Behavior Of Chinese Private Listed Companies

The families who ultimately control the majority shareholding by the pyramid method control over listed companies. When the law can not effectively protect the small shareholders'rights, related party transactions within the pyramid structure will increase shareholder against the interests of small shareholders.Theoretical studies find that supporting behavior has an important effect on the optimal ownership structure of listed companies; Only if the outside investors does not expect the tunnelling behavior, the pyramid structure is the optimal ownership structure.Empirical studies indicate that the characteristics of the corporation governance affect the controlling shareholders'acts. When the listed companies have the better performance, the family-controlled shareholders of listed companies use the pyramid structure to conduct tunneling related party transactions; when the listed companies get into a crisis, they are likely to support; controlling families'propping probability is proportional to their cash flow right,Tunneling probability is inversely proportional to their cash flow rights; the probability of propping issuing foreign shares,or Hong Kong-listed companies is greater; The information disclosure associates with the transaction on tunnelling behavioris less than on supportting transaction; Propping probability is negatively related to debt ratio.Inhibiting the formation of pyramid structure, establishing a standard directors board and information disclosure system, providing effective oversight mechanism will help to promote our family business long term, stable and healthy development.