Research On The Design Of Online Commerce Reputation Mechanism Based On The Theory Of Mechanism Design

About 35.2% users are dissatisfied with the credibility integrity of the Internet transactions, which shows that there are also some shortcomings about the current reputation mechanism while it is promoting the online transactions. The mechanism achieves its value by reducing the risk of moral hazard and enhancing the mutual trust between traders. In order to optimize the reputation mechanisms based on some existing defects, the mechanism design theory is needed to be used. The two sides give their verbal abuse on the internet to express their dissatisfaction under the current reputation mechanism. This phenomenon not only shows the defects of the mechanism, but also indicates the limitation of the current research area of the mechanism design theory. Every existed mechanism is designed to achieve a certain economic goals, so the classifications of the mechanism according their goals has be established for the first time, as the transaction mechanism, organizational mechanism and service mechanism. The defects analysis of the current reputation mechanism need to be finished before the use of mechanism design theory to optimize the reputation mechanism, which grouped as service mechanism. So the defects are (1) the relative unfair of the reputation-gain of different transaction value; (2) do not use reputation indicator to reduce information search costs and information management costs; (3) the evaluate levels can not meet motivation requirements; (4) no information exchange in the report process; (5) the simple reputation gains lack the game theory ideas and game equilibrium; (6) closed reputation caste can not satisfy the needs of the economic and social development.Based on the mechanism's goal-classifications and the existing defects of the current reputation mechanism, the optimization of reputation mechanism should deal with the three dimensions of fairness, information and incentive. The research on the fairness dimension shows the result fairness is decided by the together work of the equity of reports right, the process fairness and the fairness reputation-gain from different transaction value and the calculation by Log the transaction value will reach the relative fairness and improve the result fairness. The research on the information dimension gained that the indicator reputation report will reduce the information search costs of buyers and online store management information costs, and submission to the expectations and reasons in the process will alleviate the current contradiction and abuses. Optimization of the incentive dimension motivates the two person of a transaction take the "tell truth" strategy a single transaction by increase the report levels and calculation of reputation score. For the long run motivation of the mechanism, the openness of the reputation caste will better than current closed reputation caste.At last, the analysis of the function realization of the optimized mechanism with strategy selection of the completely rationality and limited rationality participants are given. The completely rationality participants will analyze the counterpart's prefer before they submit their indicators reputation expectations and he will give his report according the calculation of reputation score based on their own feelings and the counterpart's expectations. The limited rationality participants will also analyze the counterpart's prefer before they submit their indicators reputation expectations and give his report according he feelings by meet the counterpart's expectations of not. Analysis of two cases proved the advantages of the optimized reputation mechanism compared with current mechanisms.