| Mortgage-backed Securitization is one of the most important financial innovation in the history of U.S.housing finance.It was designed mainly to spread credit risk to other areas to stabilize the financial system by credit risk diversification. The facts have proved that, by the mortgage securitization, it indeed help banks to reduce the pressure of capital adequacy ratio, to expand the scale of operation,to form a new source of profit and to improve asset-liability management capabilities; At the same time, mortgage securitization has also provide investors with a great of investment products and the opportunities, and has promoted the development of derivative markets.However, if there is not strict risk control during the development of financial derivatives, the changes of the price of underlying asset will caused serious loss by financial derivatives, because of its large number of complex transaction structures and strong leverage features. At the same time, due to the lack of strict information disclosure and effective explanation of the risks and benefits about derivatives, the investors can not judge the quality of assets, there is the possibility of operational errors, thus it will increase the risks.Credit chains and the agency relationship is too long and complicated so that risks are difficult to detect. Because of the institutional weakness of effective assessment of structured finance products and lack of supervision, the risk seems be accumulated to a certain degree and at the end,make bad reaction to the financial system.I will analyze the securitization process of the sub-prime mortgage crisis to clarify information asymmetry problems that exist in the mortgage-backed securities and sum up the experience from the U.S.sub-prime mortgage crisis and make some useful proposals for the development of China's housing mortgage loan securitization.This article is divided into five parts, the first part described the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the relationship between the securitization agencies to point the research topics-from the perspective of information asymmetry mortgage securities analysis.Later,Study on the viewpoint of home and abroad experts about the problem.The second part describes the participants and the basic principles of the mortgage-backed securities and the operational procedure.We know that it is very important to master the process of mortgage loan securitization to analyze the information asymmetry between the main agencies.At the same time,it is helpful to understood that the risk of transmission path by understanding the processes.The third part is one of the focus of this article, a detailed analysis of the existence of asymmetric information problems and the phenomenon of moral hazard during the mortgage-backed securities.This is the root causes of the sub-prime crisis.There are a great many subjects involved in the mortgage-backed securities.These subjects, profit-making bodies, act during the transaction based on their own profits. So, between the main subjects there exists serious information asymmetry when they act for their own interests.A comprehensive analysis about the information asymmetry and moral hazard problems in the process of mortgage-backed securities can help us better understand the securitization of mortgage loans to prevent the risk, so as to provide some significant advice about the development of China's housing mortgage-backed securities.The fourth part is the introduction of a game theory model, this model is designed to explain the existence of information asymmetry between the two key subjects, the SPV and commercial banks,of mortgage-backed securitization.Part V is a comprehensive analysis of the mortgage-backed securitization process in the presence of information asymmetries and the lessons of the U.S.sub-prime crisis.At last the paper gives the proposals about the development of China's MBS. |
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