Cooperation Mechanism For Concerted Efforts To Reduce The False Failure Returns

In the current customer-centered market environment, businesses generally adopt more liberal return policy to attract customers. But it also led to businesses facing increasingly false failure returns and a large number of false failure returns seriously affected the businesses' profit and reputation. However, the current research on false failure returns management is only in its infancy, the existing theories can not satisfy the practice of business. Therefore, we pursued a research on the manufacturer and retailer make concerted efforts to reduce the customer's false failure returns, established effective cooperation mechanisms to promote both the manufacturer and retailer make effort to reduce the rate of false failure returns.Firstly, the causes of false failure returns were analyzed from customer, retailer, manufacturer and supply chain. And the features of false failure returns were analyzed minutely. Additionally, the strategic values and specific measures of businesses actualize false failure return policy were analyzed.Secondly, aiming at double moral hazard for the manufacturer and retailer make concerted efforts to reduce customer's false failure returns, the influence of manufacturer's and retailer's efforts on false failure returns ratio was analyzed. And a revenue sharing contract under double moral hazard was designed in terms of principal-agent theory and the influence of parameters on the contract was analyzed. The results indicate that the optimal revenue sharing incentive coefficient is negatively related with the manufacturer's effort elastic coefficient, and positively related with retailer's effort elastic coefficient, and independent of the unit revenue of product, the market demand and the cost coefficient of manufacturer and retailer.Then, a long-term cooperation contract between the manufacturer and retailer was established, and the key factor for the incentive effect of long-term cooperation contract--discount rate was analyzed. The results indicate that the manufacturer's revenue and system profit under the long-term cooperation contract are not less than them under the revenue sharing contract for all discount rate, and with the increasing of the discount rate, the incentive effect of the long-term cooperation contract increases, and when the discount rate is large enough, the long-term cooperation contract can encourage both the manufacturer and retailer improve the level of effort and achieve system optimization. Finally, aiming at the cooperative conflict for the manufacturer and retailer make concerted efforts to reduce customer's false failure returns, countermeasures were proposed...