Influence Of Shareholders' Nature In China's Listed Companies On Inefficient Investment

Because of the equity concentration of listed companies in China, shareholder groups divided into two interest groups:controlling shareholders and minority shareholder.With the controlling status,controlling shareholders draw up various decisions affecting listed companies to aggrieve the interests of minority shareholders with"hollowed out",and gain private interests from this behavior. However,owing to the distinctive of structure of controlling shareholders'nature and incentive and restraint mechanisms which they are confronted with.In this case,both sides need to consider the cost of investment behavior and share the benefits of control.Then it will affect the efficiency of investment to some extent.Therefore, we study the relationship between the allocation of control rights and the over-investment behaviors under the equity concentration,combined with theoretical and empirical methods.Trying to find out the relationship between equity concentration, balance structure of ownership and efficiency investment.Providing a theoretical basis with identify appropriate countermeasures and suggestions to prevent and reduce the efficiency investment.The paper begin with the investment behavior of related theories to introductive some related background of equity management of listed companies. Builting a theory platform for analysis of efficiency investment under different allocation of control rights.Secondly,making a reasonable analysis:equity structure,equity concentration, control structure and decision tend of controlling shareholders impact on investment efficiency. Secondly, using the method of empirical study to test the theoretical analysis conclusions:(1) Referance to Richardson'method, introducting the new investment and establishing a model to make regression analysis under the investment behavior of controlling shareholders.;(2)Equity concentration and equity balance will be introduced to model,according to the different nature of controlling shareholders,the sample is divided into oversight group and conspiracy group.In each group,we make a regression analysis of over-investment intentions with listed companies'data;(3)Make a robustness test to the study model, combined with our economic policy,propose some policy recommendation to govern the over-investment behavior.