The Study Of Tunneling Behavior Of Majority Shareholders And Countermeasures

China has been in a period of transition from the labor-intensive economy into the capital-intensive economy. Stock market plays a crucial role in socialist market economy, whereas on account of its short period of development, and its inadequate protection mechanisms for investors, the issues of majority shareholders pillaging small and medium shareholders (tunneling for short) are getting increasingly worse. The major manifestation of tunneling is as follows: Occupy or transfer listed company assets, malicious affiliate transaction, invasive dividend policy, manipulate accounting report and releasing false information, a false capital contribution, secondary offerings and match stock and the like. Through these above mentioned means, majority shareholders not only pillage the profits of the small and medium shareholders, but do a lot of harms to listed enterprises and severely affect the sound development of our stock market. Therefore, the pursuit of coping measures that have solid basis in theory and prove practicable in practice is one critical issue of recent stock market and even of the whole economic society.We in this thesis focus on analyzing the reasons and Countermeasures of tunneling of majority shareholders of listed enterprises, and emphasize the illustration of Balance the equity ownership,Strengthen supervision and Market Value assessment of listed enterprises.This thesis in the first place introduces connotative meaning and normative description,and major manifestation of tunneling of majority shareholders , we list some main manifestation of tunneling and point out the fact of tunneling in economic activities and it's versatility via lots of cases.We then analyze the mechanisms of tunneling,proves that tunneling has a basis in theory and illustrates that tunneling idea is a byproduct and inevitable product of joint-stock system. Then, analyze main three reasons that result in tunneling. In the section of ownership (equity) structure, we bring forth the concept of the First-second shareholder rate index and a comparison quantity of tunneling of different ownership (equity) structure to show the phenomenon of exceeding centralization of ownership of listed enterprises. We utilize a simple model to analyze the external supervision in order to illustrate the interactive shift between the external supervision and tunneling. Meanwhile, we reveal the drawback of traditional methods of assessment through the analyses of traditional assessment. Chapter four, based on the reasons mentioned above, puts forward some countermeasures for tunneling. In particular, with respect to how to use Market Value assessment, we propose an assessment programs to put Market Value theory into practice. Market Value assessment enables to compensate for the drawback of traditional ways of assessment, but it is not the ultimate solution. For this reason, we put forth several supplementary measures in the process of use Market Value assessment to solve tunneling.In conclusion, we summarize the main idea of this thesis and indicate its innovations. Restricted by the limited level of the writer, some aspects of the issue cannot be exposited deeply, so we propose an outlook of further study in future at the end of this paper.