The Voluntary Accounting Change Research Of Listed Companies In China Based On Corporate Governance

The object of accounting is to provide accounting information for making decision. For avoiding to be useless and misleading of accounting information by unchangeable accounting policies , Accounting Principles allows enterprise to have voluntary accounting policy change. But the right of accounting choice supplies the opportunities of operating accounting earnings. Due to the natural relationship between the information of accounting earnings and corporate governance structure,the ample and perfect accounting information system plays a significant role in reducing the asymmetry of information and the controlling of reverse option as well as that of moral risk,which leads to a situation that corporate governance works efficiently and social resource is distributed properly. Moreover, the corporate governance structure is a kind of regulation and arrangement,which manages and controls the running of organizations. Whether it is sound or not to have a direct impact on the development of listed companies and capital market. It is a pity that Chinese scholars have not researched voluntary accounting change together with corporate governance structure until recent years. And what makes it worse is that the majorities research applying the method of theoretical analysis with few achievements to positive research. So, the paper aims to make systematic theoretical analysis and positive research on the relationship between corporate governance structure and voluntary accounting change.This empirical study aims to the governance characteristics of 215 companies with non-normal voluntary accounting changes in 2007.Based on the contracting incentives, it was done by the paired match of its research and control samples through a test from a company governance approach. Our research results include that the voluntary accounting changes has a significant negative correlation with the largest shareholder with proportion of the square, a significant positive correlation with the proportion of state-owned shares and a significant positive correlation with the president and general manager whether of the two level-one. At last, we give some suggestion for controlling the accounting change.