The Solution Of Cooperative Games Under The New Guidelines For The Optimal Structure And Model

This thesis is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, the concepts of weak dominance and weak stable set in classical static cooperative game without side payment(NTU game) are defined; the payoffs of cores in NTU games are refined. And relations of core, weak stable set and payoffs vector sets that cannot be weakly dominated are discussed.Games in extensive form with perfect information are considered in the second and third chapter. The player adopts the behavior rules which maintain profits of coalitions they belong to, namely, the player chooses strategies which maximize the sum of payoffs of coalitions. The concept of the best response to Nash Equilibrium of noncooperative game and characteristic functions based on this are defined. By introducing nueleolus, the dynamic optimal solution(PGN vector) is given and algorithm for the solution as well as optimal subtree (bunch) is established when individual rationality cannot be met.Concretely, finite dynamic cooperative game with perfect information and changing coalitional structures is considered in the second chapter. For dynamic game that randomly changes coalition partitions at limited fixed nodes of the game tree, the dynamic optimal solution (PGN vector) and the algorithm for constructing the optimal subtree (bunch) are given by introducing new defined character functions and optimal rules.In the third chapter, the coalitional game of finite extensive form with perfect information is considered. For coalitional games that form all coalitional partitions at beginning phase, optimal coalitional partition is constructed. The dynamic optimal solution and the algorithm for the optimal subtree (bunch) are given by introducing new defined character functions and optimal rules.