Dynamic Process And Its Equilibrium Structural Properties Of The Flow Of Information Networks

The subject studyed in this paper is network games about information connection during individuals. The researches are illumined by the paper The Law of the Few written by the famous network game scholar, Goyal S.. The architecture and dynamic process of equilibrium network of information flow network is considered, and the main contributions of this paper are to establish and realize the dynamic random process of the local information flow network; give the theorem of equilibrium network architecture for two typical local information flow networks with the core-periphery structure; examine the local information flow network with decay and discuss the architecture of equilibrium network and strict equilibrium network when all players have the same costs.,In chapter 1 we introduce the basic model with information flow, and the law of the few appears in a strict equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the core-periphery architecture of local information flow network and some interrelated results in the case of all players have the same costs and that of all players have the same costs except for one low cost player.In chapter 2 we expand the condition to that several players have the lower costs, under which we discuss the architecture of equilibrium network and give the the process and algorithm design of the dynamic change from information network to the multi-core-periphery architecture network and program a composition by Maple. We verify the core-periphery architecture of local information flow network to a comprehensive range and extend the law of the fewIn chapter 3 we investigate local information flow with decay, and discuss the architecture of equilibrium network and strict equilibrium network when all players have the same costs. Furthermore, we gave the thereom, proof, and algorithm design of the dynamic process.It should be pointed that the observation of this paper is on the basis of homogeneous link cost. Except for a certain conclusion the cost heterogeneity of plays acquiring information initiatively is limited in two levels and the mutual small differences. The fundamental reason we have to deal with the problem in this way is the complexity of general equilibrium network structure and its algorithm.