State-owned Listed Companies Executive Pay And Company Performance

With the development of market economy, competitiveness of enterprises in the final analysis is the competition for talent, and excellent senior management is the business, one of the most scarce human resources. As an important human capital, Executive compensation has been subjected to wide attention from scholars around the world, especially in recent years, executive compensation rose by leaps and bounds, prompting even more people's attention and discussion. In this paper, under the premise of principal-agent relationship, based on an analysis of the background of our system, from an accounting performance and market performance were examined two dimensions of executive compensation and corporate performance relationship, with a view to senior executives of China's state-owned listed companies incentives to provide empirical evidence of sound.This article first foreign executive compensation and company performance related research literature reviewed and synthesis; followed by an analysis of the principal-agent theory under the framework of the optimal contract theory and the theory of the sort of power management, and further analysis of our high-incentive system and regulations governing pay, as well as senior executives institutional context selection mechanism, and then from the optimal contract, the management of power, the system should be the depth of the background three perspectives mining and analysis, put forward the hypothesis; once again with the main body of China's market economy status state-owned holding listed companies as samples, from an accounting performance and market performance, respectively, the two dimensions of executive compensation and corporate performance of the correlation coefficient between, compensation-performance sensitivity and compensation for performance incentive effects of conducted tests and to further explore the interaction between the two, as well as trying to pay the principal component analysis to build a comprehensive index to be analyzed and compared; the final analysis based on the above summary of conclusions and made recommendations accordingly. In this paper, on the 2003-2008 sample of 3291 study found that state-owned listed companies, executive compensation and corporate performance was weak positive correlation between the relationship between compensation-performance sensitivity and a smaller, indicating that the optimal contract theory has a degree in China on the effectiveness of the company performance, executive compensation to explain the intensity of the weak, and even can be regarded as among the executive compensation and company performance is not related to the rapid growth of salaries in absolute terms, the widening gap between compensation and performance of co-existence of the phenomenon of no significant improvement in more common, and the incentive effects of performance pay less, to a certain extent, that the remuneration of the management of the phenomenon of self-set with the possibilities that exist in our country, indicating that the economic development in China's transition process, the optimal contract theory and the management of the power theory of coexistence in the soil. Based on this, for the state-owned listed companies, executive compensation incentives, the future in addition to strengthening the executive pay disclosure and sound corporate governance mechanism, but also well-designed compensation system and effective performance evaluation system, and considered for promotion, job and its associated potential effects of a variety of incentives to further improve the incentives for executives and actively guide the incentive effects of compensation contracts, while doing a good job of power management, supervision and restraint, to effectively prevent the pay agent contract itself becomes part of the problem.