G Company Subsidiary Of The Parent-subsidiary Corporate Governance Model Manager Incentive Pay

A prominent feature of modern corporate system is that ownership and management control are separate, multi-level and low efficiency Principal-agent relationship of current state-owned company made themselves at a disadvantage position in the international marketing competition, had trouble in getting sustainable competitiveness and innovation capability and had no ability to participate in international competition. According to human capital theory, we know that managerial level of state-owned company is a special kind of human capital that they are trained both by high costs of education and hard working of themselves and nation. They stand in a dominant position in management, the key factors deciding the configuration of various limited resources and improve management efficiency, the strategic core human resources which modern companies are lacking most and which are helping in getting sustainable competitive advantage. But the problem that the incentive and restraint mechanisms of the state-owned company managerial level is being in a low efficiency state.We know, from the aspect of economic management, the state-owned company operator is a "economic man" who is seeking to maximize their utility and grasping and possessing a large number of "personal information" which the owner unknown and had to verify. Whether their behavior and decision could be"subjective input"or would create "moral hazard" behavior and "adverse selection" which is inconsistent with the goal of owner, even conflict. This requires us to consider that designing a scientific and rational incentive system to "stimulate" and "lure" operators to adopt a behavior reaching the goal of owner , reducing principal-agent costs has become the core of motivation theory of modern company. International research on business incentive system is already 80 years ,has also evolved a more mature approach in specific practicing process. However, for the different national condition of China, overseas practices and experiences for China is more a reference than a copy because of the adaptability. Motivation of managerial level of state-owned company is a step by step and elaborating process.Under the state system, the existing motivation systems of managerial level -- an annual salary system still has abuses and deficiencies either from the aspect of corporate governance and human capital and other related theory or from aspect of the actual verification of the results. Incentive effects is poor or even negative incentive effects are rather widespread. This article will start a preliminary study on current annual salary system status and performance assessment indicators of subsidiary managerial level of G corporation, find out problems existing in motivation systems of subsidiary managerial level of G corporation throughout the annual salary philosophy and structure and management performance evaluation system and indicators and the relationship between corporate governance and the effectiveness of motivation, propose effective observations to further strengthen incentive mechanism of state-owned company starting from the ideas of human capital, establishment of salary structure, scientific establishment and improvement of performance indicators and establishment of independent director system..