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Riches Phenomenon Of Executives In Chinese State-owned Property Rights Change Research

Posted on:2012-10-24Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2199330335958131Subject:Law and economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since Reform and Opening up, along with China's state-owned property rights reform, the birth of a number of property millionaires, ordinary workers, however, have not been given the treatment improved. Inequitable distribution of existing wealth gradually aroused the universal concern, how to pay more attention to social equity when achieve to economic development. In this paper, to equity and efficiency perspective, author analyzes and discusses the phenomenon of senior management's sudden wealth in the process of property right changes of China's state-owned enterprises.In the introduction, this paper points out social injustice caused by senior management's sudden wealth in the process of property rights change, defines the meaning of sudden wealth,efficiency and equity and reviews the relative theory: property rights theory and agent theory.ChapterⅠis the main form of ownership in the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises—joint-stock system. This chapter points out that joint-stock system is inevitable choice after reform of property rights in China has experienced the Decentralized, contracting phase, it is the optimal choice after compared with other organizations and it is the only way for the future reform of state-owned property.ChapterⅡis actual performance on senior management's sudden wealth in the change of property rights in state-owned enterprises. This chapter lists a large number of phenomenon on senior management's sudden wealth in the change of property rights in China's state-owned enterprise, and takes "Xi Gang" case as an example for analysis, summarizes the basic routines used by senior management to achieve their property rich, pointing out that the negative impact of the phenomenon including: impairing social equity, constraining economic efficiency, undermining social harmony and stability.ChapterⅢis the analysis of the reasons on senior management's sudden wealth in the change of property rights in state-owned enterprises. This chapter analyzes seven reasons about the executives as well as their family riches at state-owned enterprises property rights reform. First, changes in state-owned property rights more than the pursuit of efficiency, focus on equity is not enough. Second, there is a loophole that can be used by major shareholders because of the unreasonable ownership structure. Third, an inadequate cooperate governance structure gives some managements an opportunity to do whatever they want. Furthermore, a lack of incentive mechanism lead to a motivation insufficient in managements. At the same time, the establishment of social service agencies market is lagging behind and there are not enough qualified faculties in such agencies. In addition, the cost of illegal action is relatively low due to the deficiency in property rights change system. Last but not least, poor implementation of the property rights system and shortage in effective channels of supervision.Chapter IV is the proposal on how to reduce senior management's sudden wealth in the change of property rights in state-owned enterprises.Specifically, it refers seven aspects: pay more attention to social equity rather than pursue efficiency in isolation; complete the ownership structure gradually to rule the action of major shareholders; perfect the corporate governance structure step by step in order to restrict the managements in a company; make a healthy development in company by improving a more robust system of motivation; strengthen the integrity building in social intermediary services and enhance the quality of the faculties; increase the illegal cost by the means of improving the property rights reform system, make great efforts to implementation of property rights reform system as well as broaden supervision channels.In conclusion, the author believes that the best way to advance Chinese state-owned property rights evolution is to take joint-stock system as a main organization form. Furthermore, we can take up property rights change as well as achieve social equity to the maximum extent from such seven suggestions mentioned in chapter IV. As a result, an efficiency- pursued market economy may develop in a scope that public can endure and the dual value of social equity and efficiency will be fulfilled.
Keywords/Search Tags:property rights, fairness and efficiency, joint-stock system, ownership structure, governance structure
PDF Full Text Request
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