Study On Behavior Of The Stock Price Manipulation In Refinancing Activity Of Listed Companies In Times After The Split Share

Refinancing activity is an important part of the securities market, the efficiency of its operation is directly related to the stock market success. However, due to China's special economic system and economic backgrounds with the capitalist countries have huge differences, so the beginning of the birth of a number of institutional arrangements in unreasonable. Eventually, it leads to the lowly operational efficiency of China's stock market to refinance and the extremely serious stock price manipulation, and leads to serious disruption of China's capital market economic order. The stock market is based on the economic system as so as economic activity. Stock price manipulation in the stock market severely weakened the economic survival of the securities market operation system, and that only from a system level study of China's stock market, in order to address the root causes of China's stock market refinancing activities in the stock price manipulation.Based on the existing literature, this article focuses on the use of institutional economics and rent-seeking with asymmetric information theory and the theory of investor behavior deviation of split share structure after the era of re-financing activities in China's stock market stock price manipulation behavior. This article is selected from 2005 to 2008 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples, and select market index, information efficiency, equity structure, capital stock turnover and the average number of holdings and other indicators and analogy with the additional empirical research the stock price of re-financing activities manipulation sub-categories of placements found that:(1) from this choice of event window the cumulative excess returns of view, the cumulative excess rate of return of additional activities is far more than the cumulative rate of return of over-allotment activities, and those have a positive excess rate of return. (2) The degree of stock price manipulation showed a significant negative correlation with information symmetry indicating the manipulators use information asymmetry to manipulate stock prices, waiting for good news and the release of profit fled. In addition, from both the announcement effect can be seen that two kinds of re-financing activities, there is obviously a sign of leakage of information in advance. (3) LiuTongpan ratio and stock price manipulation showed significant negative correlation but the size of the outstanding shares of stock price manipulation showed significant positive correlation, indicating small stock investors' the right of "vote with their feet," is promoted in post-reform era, while LiuTongpan has manipulation of expansion possible, because the major shareholders after the share reform achieve dual control possible on the secondary market and listed companies. (4) The number of holdings per household and stock price manipulation showed a significant positive correlation while turnover and stock price manipulation there was a marked positive correlation. There is a description of any outstanding shares will inevitably lead to manipulation of accounts to manipulate the flow of trends, but also accompanied by a sharp rise in turnover, which also provide a reference for control the manipulation of the phenomenon to the regulators. (5) The market-oriented process and stock price manipulation showed significant negative correlation while there is a positive correlation between stock price manipulation and the degree of equity concentration, indicating perfect competitive market is an effective external corporate governance mechanisms. It can be effectively bound by the right of ownership and control of caused by separation of manager agent behavior, also can play an effective role in the binding for large shareholders to obtain private gain behavior and suppression of the manipulator in the secondary market stock price manipulation. From the conclusions of this article can be seen, even though China had split share structure reform, but the antagonism between a major shareholder and the interests of small shareholders in refinancing activities has still not been fully resolved, a major shareholder can still superiority exploit minority shareholders through its own funds and information.Through the long term, after the split share structure reform, the structure of corporate governance changes, equity degree of concentration tends to a more and more reasonable areas, large shareholders of listed companies are more willing to enlarge the value of company, and all aspects of supervision also gradually put in place.