Bidding Strategy In The Baseline Model And Its Extension Model Study

The theory and application of the auction is an important branch of economics, its content involves two respects research, that is quality analysis and quantity analysis. Auction, as an old mechanism of trading, has its history over at least two thousand years, but economists began to study them less than 100 years ago. With the appearance of the game theory and its extensive application, the auction theory had got a considerable development. Now, the auction form is more and more, in the mean time, its position is more and more important. So, the theory and application of the auction is a question that is worth studying.Analyses begin with simplifying all kinds of auctions into four"standard"or basic types of auctions: English Auction (ascending-bid auction), Dutch auction (descending-bid auction), First Price Auction and Second Price Auction (Vickrey Auction). Among them, English auction is applied most, while the Second Price Auction is much less commonly used than other types of auctions. It is studied in part because of its attractive theoretical properties.Early economists conjectured that expected prices generated by different types of auctions might differ from each other. But under the Benchmark Model, we have the conclusion that different auction forms yield the same expected revenue. This is the Revenue Equivalent Theorem (RET). Despite perfect reasoning of RET, it does not match what we have observed in practice. Research on the expended IPV model is much important.This paper research the sequential auction of the bidder and the revenue of the bid taker under Independent Private Value (IPV) Model. Then, we study on the expended IPV model. When the bidder is risk-averse, research on the revenue of the bid taker through analyze the sequential auction of the bidder, the revenue is higher in the first-price auction. When the bidders are colluding, we analyses the bidder's collusive biding behavior and the strategic response by the seller at single-object second-price and first-price auctions. The second-price and first-price auction collusive bidding mechanism are found to be incentive comparative and efficient direct-revolution collusive mechanism. Upon discovering bidders' collusive behavior, the seller may raise his reserve price to prevent the payoff from reduce.