Exchange Of Regulatory Institutional Arrangements Of Historical Evolution

As a historical study, ?°The Evolution of Institutional Arrangement for Regulation of Exchanges: A Historical Study and Implications for China?±investigates the evolution of institutional arrangement for regulation of exchanges. The dissertation focuses on origins and significant transformations of institutional arrangement for regulation of exchanges in history, while referring to the recent hot topics?aelectronic trading and demutualization of exchanges. By collecting, screening and researching into historical materials, the dissertation concludes practical rules of the evolution of institutional arrangement for regulation, and deducts a theoretical law of the emergence and evolution of regulation modes. The kernel of this law is generally applicable to analyzing and explaining the reality of institutional arrangement for regulation of exchanges in related countries including China.Besides a brief introduction, the dissertation is mainly composed of four parts. In part 2, the author describes origins and development of emerging regulation, typically in the UK and the USA, and the government¨Cdominated regulation, typically in France ,Germany, and China (before 1949), in early days of their securities markets respectively. Self-regulated organizations in emerging markets and governmental agencies in government-dominated markets were gradually formed as the two polarized regulatory powers in related countries in both cases, the earlier formed one of which played the key role of regulation, while the other was rather weak in a certain period of time after its formation. In part 3, exemplifying the establishment of Securities and Exchange Commission in the USA, computerization of transaction technology and demutualization of exchanges in the world, the author analyzes how the evolution of institutional arrangement for regulation of exchanges happened, explains why regulation failure and innovation activity as impetuses may induce an institutional change of regulatory arrangement, and concludes that institutional arrangement may be stagnated due to such resistance as time lag of cognizance and practice or rigid notions of regulation regardless of any existing impetus and driving force. In part 4, the regulation patterns are creatively classified under four modes?aself-regulation, subordination, opposition and cooperation, different from those accepted types, by referring to the relationship between self-regulated organizations and governmental agencies. The theoretical law of the emergence and evolution of regulation modes can be deducted as follows: regulation modes are decided by the source of regulation powers of exchanges and governmental agencies; the regulation pattern may evolve from one mode to another when the market environment changes. At the same time, the author considers cooperation based on the transfer of contractual rights as the best mode. In part 5, the author reviews the evolutionary process of institutional arrangement for regulation of securities and futures market in China. According to the law in part 4, the mode of institutional arrangement for regulation in China is defined as subordination, which does not suit with the current situation of market environment. The author suggests that the cooperation mode based on reasonable and effective decentralization and legislative coordination between securities and futures exchanges and China Securities Regulatory Commission should become the aim to improve the institutional arrangement for regulation in China.On the basis of historical materials, the dissertation concludes practical rules of the evolution of institutional arrangement for regulation, and deducts a theoretical law of the emergence and evolution of regulation modes, and applies these rules and the law to the current situation in China. Its conclusions have both theoretical significance and relevance to China?ˉs market regulation.