Empirical Study Of The Relationship Of Control Over The Configuration Of China's Listed Companies And Corporate Performance

With the development of the Non-tradable Shares Reform, it has become a hot topic in the field of theories and practice how to improve the quality of public companies so as to protect the benefits of investors, especially social public investors, and to make China's capital market form the balance mechanism among power institution, decision institution, monitoring institution and the managers according to the requirements of modern business system. However, what new characteristics appeared for the stakeholders and the power assignments of these public companies after the Non-tradable Shares Reform was reformed? What influence was brought to the improvement of performance of these public companies? The management experience of successful companies in developed countries showed that the acting problem of big stakeholders and small stakeholders is the key that harasses the capital market, and that it is the emergent requirement for the development and perfection of China's capital market to study the management behavior of company controlment power completely and systematically.The paper made an analysis of company controlment power and company performance first based on the centralization level of share rights. In course of empirical study the author made a statistical description by using the index CR, Z and H representing the centralization level of share rights, and made a regressive analysis. The statistical testing results showed that the share rights in China's public companies are still mainly centralized in the hands of the biggest share stakeholder, but the other stakeholders have strengthened the limitation to the biggest stakeholder.In the level of director board, the representative number of each stakeholder will play a big role in making decisions because the resolution of director board is made by the directors. The scale of director board, the number of independent directors and the phenomenon of board chairman dictatorship all make an important influence on the company performance. Nevertheless, the agreement has not made among domestic scholars until now because of the difference in studying objects and samples. In this paper the author make an analysis of independent directors and the scale of director board, and make a statistical analysis of professional situation of the board chairman and general manager.The paper can be divided into five parts: (1) The problem and the studying objects were proposed; (2) The disprovable hypothesis was proposed after the literature review; (3) The technological method and the attainment of data were explained; (4) The conclusion was made after the hypothesis was tested by the data and recursive model, and the testing result was interpreted by use of economic theories; (5) The policy proposals and the limitation of the study were given.