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Zero For The Bilateral Relationship Between Market Pricing And Vertical Control

Posted on:2008-11-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X L CengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2199360242969042Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The vertical relationship between retailers and suppliers has changed dramatically with the rapid extension of retailers. The increase of retailers' buyer power caused great influence on the relationship between retailers and suppliers. One of the most outstanding problems is the retailer-supplier dissension which often happened recently. Beginning with the description and analysis of the retailer-supplier dissension, this thesis investigates the problems in China's retail industry, using the conceptions and methods of the theory of industry organization, centering on the pricing mechanism of retail service and vertical restraints behavior.The thesis is arranged as follows.Chapter 1 describes the arising and focuses of the retailer-supplier dissension and the current research both in China and abroad, shows a significance of selecting this topic with the features and methods in this thesis.Chapter 2 analyzes the market features of the retail industry concretely by: (1) defining the retail service; (2) introducing the parties concerned with the industry and their responsibilities, which is prepared for research; (3) pointing out the retail industry has the features of the two-sided market, which is the important base of the analysis for pricing mechanism that will be mentioned later; (4) from the angle of supply introducing the developing history of Chinese retail industry and pointing out one of the most important developing features is the concentration ratio has been becoming higher and higher; (4) from the angle of demand illustrating that the retail industry is less demand elastic, and the customer demand causes the supplier demand. The market analysis in this chapter is the base of discussion for pricing mechanism.Chapter 3 and 4 analyze the pricing mechanism of retail industry and vertical restraints behavior of retailers, which are the main parties of this thesis. Chapter 3 analyzes the pricing mechanism from the angle of the basis and principle by: (1) showing that the bases for pricing are costs of the retail service and features of the two-sided market; (2) introducing the pricing procedure of slotting allowance with the model of pricing mechanism of the two-sided market and illustrating the important meaning and social impact of slotting allowance; (3) analyzing the price fluctuation of the retail service, using the method of comparative statistics, pointing out that the retailers are inclined to improve the slotting allowance on one hand, on the other hand ,suppliers refuse to pay the slotting allowance through building their own marketing channels, which is closely related to the market analysis mentioned above. It reflects the new idea of this thesis to apply the pricing mechanism of the two-sided market to analyze the slotting allowance.Due to the important influence of retailers' on pricing mechanism, the amount of slotting allowance have keen relation with the vertical restraints behaviors of retailers. Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between slotting allowance and the vertical restraints behaviors of retailers, analyzes the market equilibrium with and without slotting allowance, illustrates the vertical restraints behaviors of retailer worse the relationship with suppliers.In order to release the retailer-supplier dissension and promote the health development of Chinese retail industry, chapter 5, enumerating some conclusions and policy implications, is the summary of this thesis as well.
Keywords/Search Tags:two-sided market, pricing mechanism, slotting allowance, vertical restraints, anti-trust
PDF Full Text Request
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