Family Of Listed Companies Ownership Structure And Corporate Performance

With the development of the market economy of our country,the function of family business is more and more remarkable day by day in society and economy.Numerous researches indicate that the vicissitudes of enterprises,achievement quality depend on,to a great extent,whether the enterprise's inside governace structure is efficient.The ownership structure is the basis of corporate governance structure,only the reasonable ownership structure could form a reasonable corporate governance structure,which can guarantee the good performance of enterprises,so the ownership structure of family business is critical to the subsistence of the firm,also affecting it's development.Practice of China's capital market has proved,for the family of listed companies,the listed family companies in different ways show the different characteristics in the agency problem and ownership structure,and the internal influence of mechanisms is different for the ownership structure and corporate performance.This paper will comparatively analyze the relevance of ownership structure and corporate performance between the direct and indirect family of listed companies,and provide more reasonable perspective for the study of ownership structure and corporate performance.According to the study at home and abroad,base on the theory of agency that arose from altruism,the paper take 238 family of listed companies in 2006 as the sample for the theoretical analysis and empirical research of the relativity between ownership structure and firm performance. In the explanatory variables-corporate performance,this article selects a number of financial indicators relating of firm peformance,and uses the way of factor analysis to establish the performance evaluation model,and chalks up the variables be interpreted-Comprehensive performance factor;in the explanatory variable-ownership structure,there are two main types and the five variables of the set of explanatory variables,namely,the proportion of family ownership,the proportion of the top five shareholders,the degree of Equity Restriction,cash-flow rights and the degree of separation of Pyramidal structure;and the paper introduces the dummy variables to distinguish between direct and indirect listed companies.Positive test results show that for the direct market for the family company,it is significantly positive correlation between the proportion of family ownership,the proportion of the top five shareholders and corporate performance,and it is significantly inverted U-shaped relationshiP between the degree of Equity Restriction,cash-flow rights and corporate performance,and it is positive correlation between the degree of separation of Pyramidal structure and corporate performance.For the indirect market of the family company,it is significantly inverted U-shaped relationship between the proportion of family ownership,the proportion of the top five shareholders, the degree of Equity Restriction and corporate performance,it is negatively correlated relationship between the degree of separation of Pyramidal structure and corporate performance,and it is positive correlation between cash-flow rights and corporate performance.This study results show that for the different listed forms of family business,the firm performance and the transmission mechanism between ownership structure and firm performance is different;direct listing family-owned companies is better than the indirect listing companies;For indirect listing company,there are significant differences of the effectiveness and the goal between the controlling shareholder and outside investors,the agency problem and the controlling shareholders increase occupation using of pyramid ownership structure is very serious;for direct listing companies,which is developed from the original family business,they come into the market through IPO after a long-term growth in China's capital market to meet the high threshold of entering the market.Many companies are carrying the ideal of "hundred years of prosperity",which makes direct listed companies pay more attention to family the company's long-term performance, and the effectiveness between the controlling shareholders of these companies and the outside investors is basically the same,it is far from the agency problem of the family of listed companies indirectly serious.Through comparative analysis,the article concludes with a number of recommendations to make ownership structure of family listed companies perfect:improve the controlling shareholders of listed companies conduct oversight mechanisms;encourage the family business coming into the market directly,and promote the sound development of family companies by raising the level of information disclosure of listed companies,in particular emphasis on the moral level of the controlling shareholder of the disclosure.