Competitive Form Of Ownership Concentration And Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies Empirical Research

The modern company is essentially characterized by the separation of ownership and management rights which leads to the problem of asymmetric information and higher agency cost. So it is a core issue in the modern company governance theory that how to form the optimal corporate governance structure reduce the agency costs and then maximize the corporate value.Ownership structure is the foundation of corporate governance, which determines the distribution of the residual claim right and the residual control rights. Different ownership structure indicates different distribution of rights and interests. Stockholders with different natures and stock-holding proportion have different corporate status and investment purpose, hence causing different corporate governance mechanism and performance. It is thus clear that ownership structure is closely related to corporate performance. The more reasonable ownership structure is, the higher corporate performance is. However, because the different competitive environment has different effect on the corporate internal, the listed company shows different supervision and incentive mechanism and investment, which ultimately affects the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. Therefore it is significant to study the subject further from the point of competitive industries for the optimization of ownership structure in China.Firstly this paper states the related research system and results at home and abroad with the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance of listed companies as to correspond the point. And then on the basis of two rights separated theory, property right theory, beyond property right theory and principal-agent theory, we do further research and conclude that the competition is the most fundamental factor to improve corporate governance mechanism and the efficiency.Secondly, according to the related research results and theoretical analysis, the paper proposes the hypotheses about ownership structure and corporate performance. After that,42 listed companies of different competitive industries are chosen as the sample for study which satisfies the terms all the time from year 2006 to 2008. In the empirical analysis, concentration ratios of shares CR1,CR5,H5,Z are set as explainable variable and statistical described per year. In addition, after using principal component analysis method to establish a comprehensive corporate performance, the paper makes use of panel data to build up multivariate regression models to analysis. The results show that there are more listed companies with high concentration ratio of shares in China. The domination of state-held shares of the listed companies is still obvious. As for the different competitive industries, concentration ratio of shares has different influence on corporate value. In the competitive electronic industry, concentration ratio of shares is related to the corporate performance positively. But in the excavation industry, the relation between concentration ratio of shares and corporate performance is hump-shaped.In combination with the above conclusions and the current market environment, this paper puts forward how to optimize ownership structure and improve the management efficiency. Specifically, the measures are as follows:(i) to establish moderately centralized ownership structure especially the check and balance ownership structure;(ii) to consider the impact of different competitive industries on the relationship between concentration ratio of shares and corporate performance;(iii) to perfect the market competition mechanism;(iiii) to establish closely-held structure which exists multiple large shareholders.