Contractual Arrangements Empirical Research On The Risk Of Investment And Financing Efficiency

Based on the New Institutional Economics and Contract Theory, this paper focuses on building a micro-basis of contract for the venture capital market. And then, it analyzes the double trust-agent relationship between the investor and the venture capitalist, with the venture capitalist and the venture company. On the one hand, the paper applies the limited partnership of the venture capital organization form to describe the contractual arrangement and regulate the contractual relation between the investor and venture capitalist. On the other hand, the choice of the manners of investment, investment tools and incentive ways can reduce the uncertainty of enterprise's behavior and the investment risk which venture capitalist faced.This article builds up the micro-basis of contract of China's venture capital market from the point of view of the resource allocation function of different contract structures. Then, it estimates the technical efficiency and scale efficiency of the China's venture capital industry and finds their mutual influence. This paper makes a DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) method to measure the efficiency of venture investment and financing by using the data from 2001 to 2008. Then it makes full use of multiple linear regression analysis to verify the various factors affecting the efficiency of China's venture capital market investment and financing. Accordingly, it also gives us the methods how to improve this efficiency.This paper doesn't repeat the whole process of venture capital, the regulations and environment. It also fails to explore the evolution path of the venture capital's organization form. However, all these problems can be the focus in the future research.