Performance Of Listed Companies Risk Management Methods And Their Optimization

The separation of ownership rights from management rights in modern corporations has brought about the problem of corporate governance, In the principal-agent relationships between shareholders and managers, due to asymmetric information and responsibility, incentive incompatibility as well as incomplete contracts, the agents may maximize their own benefits by"adverse selection"and"moral hazard", thus the interests of shareholders as well as the companies are damaged. Therefore, a well-designed managers performance evaluation and incentive system is of great significance for the maximization of enterprises'value and shareholders'wealth. This is the main work in the performance risk management.When the shareholders want to manage the risk of performance fluctuation. They have the direct and indirect method to do this job, the indirect method involves establishing the compensation system and the bonus bank to inspire the manager work harder to meet the expected level of performance in the shareholders, which place a good condition on achieving the good performance, rather than guarantee the ultimate actual level of performance. And the second, the direct method managing the ultimate actual level of performance involve using a financial tool to insure or hedge the actual level, so this paper analyze the sensitivity of pay-to-performance and bonus bank in the constructing a compensation system based on the EVA evaluation approach in the content of indirect method, and then initiate a newly constructed financial tool to manage the risk of performance in the content of direct method.First, this paper introduces the traditional outcome of the sensitivity of pay-to-performance in the classic principal-agent model and some controversial empirical research outcome opposing to the outcome of the classic model. Then this article places the facts that there are real options in the modern company management, so this paper make a new research on the sensitivity of pay-to-performance under the real options condition for tentatively seek out a new explaining to the controversial empirical research outcome.Then this paper analyze the functions of bonus bank relating to the modern EVA bonus plan,such as the long-term influence and the efficiency, and discuss some defect of the bonus bank, and makes some improvements as to make the bonus bank more incentive to the manager.The last this paper introduces and tentatively constructs a"performance-reverse option", thought this tool is not available in the current market, but it may produce some thinking and more free rooms for the shareholders to manage the performance risk.The aim of this paper is to making some improvement in the EVA-based compensation plans for making it more efficient, and the same time make the management of performance risk more practical and easy.