| Since 1980's setting up a modern enterprise institution has become the theme of China's state-owned enterprises reform with the deepening of reforms. With the development of market economy and the establishment of competition mechanism in China, state-owned enterprises are facing more and more problems. One is the debt burden. Because of low efficiency of investment and low market competition force, many a state-owned enterprise can't even pay the interest for their loans. Under such a background, the tool of "debt-for-equity swap" was introduced into China. It really played an important role in solving some state-owned enterprises problems.This thesis takes the debt-for-equity swap and enterprise institution innovation as its subject. It is generally accepted that the debt-for-equity swap is a tool of releasing the burden for state-owned enterprises. However, the author points out that from the Neo-institutional economics point of view, the debt-for-equity swap is a kind of enterprise institution innovation for its capital structure change and corporate governance establishment. Based on this point, the author continues to point out that the ultimate tool for solving the state-owned enterprises problems is the innovation of enterprise mechanism.The typical feature of China's corporate governance is internal control. In the past, people often tried to seek a reason for this in "property rightss". Acknowledging the importance of the property rightss, however, the author maintains that the intrinsic relationship between capital structure and corporate governance should not be overlooked. This thesis intends to make a detailed analysis on the interaction mechanism between corporate governance and capital structure, and the author will be happy if this could be of some useful reference to the construction of modern enterprise institution with Chinese characteristics.At present, debt-for-equity swap as a temporary policy acts as positive effect for our economy, which can not only release state-owned enterprises from heavy interest burden but also reduce bad assets ratio of banks and be helpful for defending financial risk. However, we should see the related negative effect: on the one hand, it will weaken the debt restriction to the enterprises and maybe save some state-owned enterprises which should be washed out because of low efficiency.The most important reason why our state-owned enterprises fall into debt trap is that their investment exceeds the reasonable level that should be fit for their self-accumulation or we can call it "low efficiency of investment". Lots of investments are lack of efficiency, which results in heavy internal burden for enterprises. The managers of state-owned enterprises haven't reasonable money income and pursue the power income as possible as they can. They have strong impulse of investment and expansion. But they are only responsible for the poor limited liability and even nothing for the lack of the effective restricting and monitoring of report mechanism. The build perfect report mechanism is very vital for the management and enterprises are short of enough motives to do the business for the long-term benefit of the enterprises because they themselves are temperately managers and their tenure decided not only by how much they earn for the enterprises. The above changes must be done on the conditions on the reform of property rightss.The relationship between debt-for-equity swap and enterprise institution innovation is placed in great position in this research. Specifically, three key aspects of their relationship are brought as follows. First, the research provides the main models of reconstructing bad debts. The author divides them into two categories: special model and common model according to whether they make the transformation of debt to equity. Second, the theoretical basis of debt-for-equity swap is examined in detail. The author put forward the necessity or the swap and the useful function of swap in setting up modern enterprise mecha... |
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