| Corporate Governance is a well-known difficult subject in micro-economics field nowadays. On the one hand, modern enterprise system which with corporate organization of its character is the chief configuration of organization in market economy country, it shows the intrinsic request that enterprise becomes the face-to-market commonality and part of market competition. On the other hand, corporate organization must be found with separation of ownership, operating right and control power. Agency problem which decreases corporation value is always in existence in modern corporation. How to resolve it as far as possible becomes the key to make full use of superiority of modern enterprise system. Based on such facts, the thesis makes "The Use of Accounting Information in Corporate Governance" as its research subject, and tries to approach this problem in two aspects: One is the related theories of Corporate Governance and history of agency problem, the other is to study the use of accounting information in Corporate Governance systematically with accounting information as the bridge of Corporate Governance and business management.The paper is composed of two parts, the introduction and the main body. The introduction part gives readers a clear idea of the discussion target and its background, making a good start to further discussion. The main body includes six parts:Part One: Basic Theories of Corporate Governance. First, review the concept of Corporate Governance in the narrow and broad sense: Narrow sense of Corporate Governance is the balance relationship between investor and manager, broad sense of it is to handle the relation of related members with different benefits, such as shareholder, loan person, manager and employee, in order to do a whole system arrangement of theeconomic target. The writer expatiates the related theories and its latest research results of firm character. The New-institutional Economics thought that enterprise is the Nexus of Contracts. From this, the essence of Corporate Governance is a contract about ownership arrangement, and the most important contractual combinations are investment relationship, debtor-creditor relationship and employment relationship. Because of diverse related members, we must harmonize their interests in order to maximize the value and efficiency of enterprise. The mode of profit sharing system is more acceptable than the mode of shareholder supremacy.Part Two: Actual Condition of Corporate Governance. Insider control is different from the problem of insider control. It has its inhere advantage. On one side, the separation of decision-making and decision-control is useful of lowering agency cost. On the other side, it is also helpful of advancing the adaptability for environment and the power of creation for manager, according to the Contingency Theory. At the same time, insider control is a two-edge sword. As the goals of contracting parties are different, we must harmonize it. Asymmetric information and incomplete contract make the coordination of each contract makers can't proceed with low cost, and then the problem of insider control produced, including exorbitant on-the-job consumption and short-term behavior, etc. The most efficient method to resolve agency problem is to synthesize Corporate Governance and corporate management. Accounting information provided by management authorities is a ligament of them, which is important to improve Corporate Governance.Part Three: The Composition And Essence of Accounting Information . Financial accounting information which plays a key role in Corporate Governance is the main content of accounting information. As a matter of fact, we always want to inspire and supervise manager inorder to protect it from abusing non-human resources, but it can't be real-time mentoring. Information about operational performance should be provided to each of the contracting parties then. As the reflection of historical financial position, operating results and cash flow, financial accounting information can... |
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