China 's Listed Company Audit Commissioned By The Right Positioning

Those phenomenon, such as die state-owned equity and absence of owners in Chinese listed companies, leads to serious strong "insider control" problem. Finally, it nude the auditing relationship of fisted companies changes from die triangle relation to the straight-fine relation. This shows that the orientation of die auditing appointment right of Chinese fisted companies is wrong. It is not appropriate that simply making the owners as die auditing consigner. Learning from die governing structure of listed companies, shareholders auditing trust is just a neoretical assumption. Under the condition of insiders' control, no matter what directors' board auditing trust, or supervisors' board auditing trust, or independent directors auditing committee, they cannot lessen the insider control phenomenon. If the present condition that the directors' board and independent directors dominate the auditing trust don't change, even if the state-owned stocks retreat from the listed companies and makes die equity structure polycentric, the ineffectiveness of the auditing trust won't change. Basing on theanalysis of die true demander of accounting information, the diesis draws a thorongh new conclusion tiiat auditing appointment right should belong to the true demander of accounting information. Through the present conditions aren't mature, it is difficult to put this theory into practice. As a transitional ways, audit appointment right can be released to securities exchanges committee. This may be some help to the distortion of accounting information.