| The reform of state-owned enterprises has been the difficulty and focus of economic and policy reform in China, and has also become a hot research theme in academe. Heretofore, there have been a large number of research literatures on state-owned enterprises reform, most of which focus on how to set up enterprise governance structure. Meanwhile, we have noticed that many stated-owned enterprises have set up relatively integrative corporation governance structure after going through corporation system reform, but the governance effect is barely satisfactory, for many of them still walk with difficulty and sated-owned assets have not been retained or increased in value but get lost in a great deal. Why cannot the governance structure that performs effectively in enterprises of developed countries get accustomed to the state-owned enterprises of China? The author's preliminary judgment is that it is respected with the environment of state-owned enterprises, which is similar to an old story that during the process of moving the orange of the south to the north only replanting the orange trees is far away from being enough. To play the role of governance structure in state-owned enterprises does not only means setting up an integral organization form, but more urgently to transform the environment of state-owned enterprises, so as to create new conditions for governance structure to play its role. What are the conditions and how to transform the environment are what the author tries to answer in this thesis.The analysis in this thesis is based on enterprise contract theories.Based on four basic assumptions and some relevant theories, this thesis, starting with the enterprise characteristics, presents that the enterprise in market is a kind of intermediate production organization with incomplete contract. The incompletion of enterprise contract determines the core position of enterprise ownership contract in all contracts, so the arrangement of enterprise ownership contract will be the main observing subject of this thesis. Then, this thesis describes the three steps of enterprises ownership contract evolution: Arrangements of enterprise ownership in proprietorship enterprise, partnership enterprise and corporation enterprise. It argues that enterprise ownership arrangement is the outcome of negotiation among all factors owners whose negotiation power mainly comes from the patent of their factors, and then the environmental transformation changes the patent of factors, which means that when the patent of factors changes with the environment, the negotiation power of factor owners also changes, and then new arrangement of enterprises ownership will emerge. The opportunism proneness of human beings determines the necessity of optimizing arrangement of enterprise ownership. Based on the comparison and analysis of many viewpoints, this thesis presents that optimized arrangement of enterprise ownership should meet the lowest-cost principle and contribution principle. These principles can only answer the question that what the optimized arrangement of enterprise ownership should be. As the contract arrangement resulting from the bargaining and negotiating among all contract parties, arrangement of enterprise ownership does not surely produces the outcome that we expected. Therefore, there is a problem emerging that how to make "what arrangement of enterprise ownership is" approach "what it should be". What we should do is to offer and creative favorable conditions for this approaching process. As mentioned above, arrangement of enterprise ownership is the outcome of negotiation among factor owners, and the two elements of their negotiation power, with respecting to negotiation aspiration and negotiation capability, are the important conditions for optimizing arrangement of enterprise ownership. Exclusive property rights, the best motivation for negotiation aspiration, are favor of producing even more enterprise rentals. Contract freedom, the best guarantee for negotiation capability,... |
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