| Among the multi level clientage proxy of the enterprise, the behaviors of the proxies are imperceptible, as there are big room for opportunism. Therefore, it becomes a must to establish supervision systems to the proxies. According to the principal of supervision systems execution, we divide the supervision systems of the proxy's opportunism into external supervision and internal supervision. The external supervision mainly relies on legislation, religion, moral, market, press and external force of the enterprise; whilst internal supervision is executed by the regulations of the enterprise itself. The costs of internal supervision include direct capital investment, as well as non-monetary costs such as time, etc. The income of internal supervision is to reduce the opportunism. The boundary of the internal supervision systems is the breakeven point between the supervision cost and financial loss caused by the opportunism behavior reduction. There are great difficulties to determine this boundary regardless in theory or in reality. First of all, the cost of the internal supervision systems is hardly measured with accuracy, as this cost are mostly be paid by non-monetary means, which has always been ignored by the proxies either with unawareness or on purpose. Secondly, it's also hard to determine the income of the internal supervision systems. The reduced opportunism is countless; therefore people calculate the activities of opportunism to decide the reduced ones. However, there are two aspects of defect: 1. There is no certain relation existed between the occurrence of opportunism and the reasonability of internal supervision systems. Behaviors of opportunism exist potentially. The criterion of opportunism behaviors is the contrast between theincome and the cost, instead of cost solely. Whilst with regard to the internal supervision, to most extent are determined by the cost. Therefore, we cannot simply judge the occurrence of opportunism behaviors to determine the efficiency of the internal supervision systems. 2. We can hardly define clearly the income breakeven point between the internal supervision systems and the external supervision systems. The internal supervision systems are the restriction of some opportunism activities, whilst external supervision systems are the necessary restriction for the serious opportunism behaviors. We could hardly judge the non-occurrence of the opportunism is the result of internal supervision systems or the external supervision systems. We could also hardly judge under the same circumstances of external supervision, if certain opportunism behaviors can be restricted through strengthening certain internal supervision systems. The enterprise itself cannot control the effectiveness of the external supervision systems, whilst it can control internal supervision systems. Therefore the enterprises are willing to consummate internal supervision systems to completely restrict the opportunism to shake off the dependence on the "unreliable" external supervision systems. When there are high costs or inefficacy on the external supervision, the proxies have to be more relying on internal supervision. Consequently the internal supervision systems have become continuously strengthening. In virtue of the difficulties in reasonable boundary judgment of the internal supervision systems, it's easily exceeded the reasonable boundary limit in the strengthening process, i.e. the costs of internal supervision systems exceed its income. We call this phenomenon as fall into "internal supervision trap". To the Chinese civil enterprises, it's a realistic issue to avoid falling into the internal supervision trap when designing the systems. In theory, the exploration of the internal supervision Systems has always been a week link. The internal supervision Systems has appeared in the theory of common Economics and Management, however, it has not been considered as a major content, which mainly embodies on the supervision relationship among the "three unions" of the enterpris... |
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