During The Transition Economy Of State-owned Commercial Banks Risk Causes Of Duality And Control Research

With background of breakout of Asian Financial Crises and entering into WTO, it is extremely vital to dissolve gigantic bad loans and strengthen risk control of Chinese state-owned commercial bank, which have been highlight issues of theoretical circles in recent years.The risk is a eternal theme that industry of bank faces. As far as how to control the risk of Chinese state-owned commercial banks are concerned, on the basis of analyzing the duality of risk cause of the state-owned commercial bank in transitional period, the article put forward some new suggestions.The duality of the risk cause of the state owned commercial bank in transitional period is that its risk cause can be-divided into general cause, which is attributed to the asymmetric information and incomplete contracts of the operational process of the state-owned commercial bank that lead to the adverse selection and moral hazard of the commercial bank which bring about credit risk,operational risk,liquidity risk,reputation risk etc and special cause, which is the blemish of the property rights arrangement of the state-owned commercial bank that result to Nash equilibrium of "the low efficiency of Pareto" Which is attributed to the games of the government state-owned commercial bank and state-owned enterprises. Thus, the bad loans of the state-owned commercial banks are continuously produced as a result of the cause of system. These make the credit risk,Operational risk,liquidity risk. reputation risk and country or sovereign risk etc of the state-owned commercial banks become more and more greater, which danger the safe of the whole industry of bank.According to the former analysis, we think that the crux of risk control of the state-owned commercial banks is to restructure the governance structure of the state-owned commercial banks on the basis of the change of property rights. As far as the external conditions of risk control are concerned, it is unsuitable for Chine to set up Deposit insurance system in transitional period. With the exception of strengthening supervision of the authoring, at the same time, to want to adjust the objects of supervision and to improve the ways of supervision.